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VULNERABLE SOFTWARE:  
PRODUCT-RISK NORMS AND THE 








Unauthorized access to online information costs billions of dollars per 
year.  Software vulnerabilities are a key cause of these losses.  Software 
currently contains an unacceptable number of vulnerabilities.  The standard 
solution notes that the typical software business strategy is to keep costs down 
and be the first to market, even if that means the software has significant 
vulnerabilities. Many endorse the following remedy: make software developers 
liable for negligent or defective designs. This remedy is unworkable.  We offer 
an alternative based on an appeal to product-risk norms.  Product-risk norms 
are social norms that govern the sale of products.  A key feature of such norms 
is that they ensure that the design and manufacture of products impose only 
acceptable risks on buyers.  Unfortunately, mass-market software sales are not 
governed by appropriate product-risk norms; as a result, market conditions 
exist in which sellers profit by offering vulnerability-ridden software.  This 
analysis entails a solution: ensure that appropriate norms exist.  We contend 
that the best way to do so is a statute based on best practices for software 
development, and we define the conditions under which the statute would give 
rise to the desired norm.  Why worry about creating the norm?  Why not just 
legally require that software developers conform to best practices?  The 
answer is that enforcement of legal requirements can be difficult, costly, and 
uncertain; once the norm is in place, however, buyers and software developers 
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Losses from unauthorized access to online information run in the billions 
per year.
1
  We assume it would be better to avoid these losses;
2
 our question is 
how best to do so.  We limit our inquiry by focusing exclusively on one 
significant source of unauthorized access: software vulnerabilities.
3
 A 
vulnerability is a property of a software system that could be exploited to gain 
unauthorized access to a computer or network.
4
 The prevailing and correct 
consensus is that software programs currently contain an unacceptable number 
of vulnerabilities.
5
  Why?  And what is the remedy?  The standard answer to 
the first question assumes that “businesses are profit-making ventures, so they 
make decisions based on both short- and long-term profitability.”
6
  Reducing 
vulnerabilities requires a longer and more costly development process, and the 
typical profit-maximizing strategy is to keep costs down and be the first to 
 
 1. In 2009, the cost of a data breach to organizations in the United States was an average $6.75 million 
per incident. PONEMON INST., 2009 ANNUAL STUDY: COST OF A DATA BREACH 3 (Jan. 2010), available at 
http://www.ponemon.org/local/upload/fckjail/generalcontent/18/file/US_Ponemon_CODB_09_012209_ 
sec.pdf.  See also Robert W. Hahn and Anne Layne Farrar, The Law and Economics of Software Security, 30 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 283, 302–08 (2007) (examining the calculated cost of a security breach).  A United 
Kingdom government study estimates the yearly cost of data breaches to be £21bn to businesses, £2.2bn to 
government and £3.1bn to citizens. DETICA, THE COST OF CYBERCRIME 2 (Feb. 2011), available at 
http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/sites/default/files/resources/the-cost-of-cyber-crime-full-report.pdf.  Earlier 
U.S. estimates of the cost of identity theft alone are also in the billions. For a summary of relevant studies, see 
FRED H. CATE, CTR. FOR INFO. POL’Y LEADERSHIP AT HUNTON & WILLIAMS, INFORMATION SECURITY 
BREACHES AND THE THREAT TO CONSUMERS 6 (Sept. 2005), available at http://www.fredhcate.com/ 
Publications/Information_Security_Breaches.pdf (reporting 10.1 million victims of identity theft in 2003 and a 
total losses to consumers of over 50 billion).  The number of victims has declined recently but costs have 
actually risen.  Jennifer Saranow Schultz, The Rising Cost of Identity Theft for Consumers, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 9, 
2011, 12:01 PM), http://bucks.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/02/09/the-rising-cost-of-identity-theft-for-consumers/ 
?src=busln (noting that  “[t]he average consumer out-of-pocket cost due to identity fraud increased to $631 per 
incident in 2010, up 63% from $387 in 2009. Such costs include the expenses of paying off fraudulent debt as 
well as resolution fees, such as legal costs”).  Schultz summarizes this report: JAVELIN STRATEGY & 
RESEARCH, 2011 IDENTITY FRAUD SURVEY REPORT: IDENTITY FRAUD DECREASES – BUT REMAINING FRAUDS 
COST CONSUMERS MORE TIME & MONEY, (Feb. 2011), available at https://www.javelinstrategy.com/uploads/ 
1103.R_2011%20Identity%20Fraud%20Survey%20Report%20Brochure.pdf (reporting the increasing cost to 
consumers of identity theft). 
 2. We assume that the gains from allowing unauthorized access (e. g., saving the time, effort, and 
money otherwise spent in prevention) are not sufficient to offset the losses.  See infra note 98 and 
accompanying text. 
 3. Vulnerabilities are a major cause of unauthorized access.  In 2010, CWE (Common Weakness 
Enumeration) and SANS (SysAdmin, Audit, Network, Security) identified cross-site scripting (XSS), SQL 
injection, and buffer overflow vulnerabilities as the causes of nearly all major cyber attacks in recent years.  
CWE/SANS TOP 25 Most Dangerous Software Errors, SANS INST., http://www.sans.org/top25-software-
errors (last updated June 27, 2011).  When releasing the list, the SANS noted that “[t]hese 25 programming 
errors, and their ‘on the cusp cousins’ have been the cause of nearly every major type of cyber attack, 
including recent penetrations of Google, power systems, military systems, and millions of other attacks on 
small businesses and home users.” Joan Goodchild, Security Experts: Developers Responsible for 
Programming Problems, CSO (Feb. 16, 2010), http://www.csoonline.com/article/544163/Security_Experts_ 
Developers_Responsible_for_Programming_Problems. (citation omitted).  See also Applications Security: 
Eliminating Vulnerabilities in Enterprise Software, INFO. WEEK, 1 (July 9, 2010), http://i.cmpnet.com/ 
darkreading/vulnerabilitymgmt/July2010_ApplicationsSecurity.Alert[1].pdf (noting that “[m]ost of the hacks 
that compromise enterprise security today are those that exploit flaws in applications”). 
 4. See, e.g., ROSS ANDERSON, SECURITY ENGINEERING 15 (Wiley Publ’g Inc., 2d ed. 2008) (defining a 
vulnerability as “a property of a system or its environment which, in conjunction with an internal or external 
threat, can lead to a security failure, which is a breach of the system’s security policy”). 
 5. See, e.g., Bruce Schneier, Information Security and Externalities, BRUCE SCHNEIER (Jan. 2007), 
http://www.schneier.com/essay-150.html (discussing information security as an economic problem). 
 6. Id. 
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offer a particular type of software, even if it is imperfect in a variety of ways, 
including having vulnerabilities.
7
  Many who offer this diagnosis endorse the 
following remedy: make software developers liable for negligent or defective 
designs—either by adapting common law tort doctrines or by enacting statutes 
based on negligence or product liability concepts.
8
  We do not dispute the 
profit-maximizing diagnosis. “The market often rewards first-to-sell and 
lowest cost rather than extra time and cost in development.”
9
 But we do reject 
the remedy.  We offer an alternative based on an appeal to product-risk norms. 
Product-risk norms are social norms that govern the sale of products.  A 
key feature of such norms is that they ensure the design and manufacture of 
products impose only acceptable risks on buyers.
10
  Unfortunately, mass-
market software sales are not governed by appropriate product-risk norms; as a 
result, market conditions exist in which sellers can, and do, profit by offering 
vulnerability-ridden software.  This analysis entails a solution: ensure that 
appropriate norms exist.  We contend that the best way to do so is a statute 
based on best practices for software development.  Our concern with the norm 
may seem puzzling.  Since we will suggest a statute, why not just stop there?  
Why not just legally require that software developers conform to best practices 
and not worry about creating a norm?  Our answer is that there are significant 
advantages to creating the norm.  Enforcement of the legal requirement can be 
difficult, costly, and uncertain;
11
 once the norm is in place, however, buyers 
and software developers will conform to best practices on their own initiative. 
 
 7. See generally C. SHAPIRO & H. R. VARIAN, INFORMATION RULES: A STRATEGIC GUIDE TO THE 
NETWORK ECONOMY 50–51 (1999).  The economics and information security community has developed 
Shapiro and Varian’s initial insights.  Much of this work has been reported in the annual Workshop on the 
Economics of Information Security since 2002. For information the workshops from 2002 to 2010, see 
http://weis2010.econinfosec.org/index.html.  For a good general survey, see Ross Anderson & Tyler Moore, 
Information Security: Where Computer Science, Economics and Psychology Meet, 367 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS 
ROYAL SOC’Y A 2717, 2721–22 (2009). 
 8. Bruce Schneier is a prominent advocate of this view.  See Bruce Schneier, Liability changes 
everything, BRUCE SCHNEIER, (Nov. 2003), http://www.schneier.com/essay-025.html (arguing that “[i]f we 
expect software vendors to . . . invest in secure software development processes, they must be liable for 
security vulnerabilities in their products”).  The theme appears frequently in the law review literature.  See, 
e.g., Jennifer A. Chandler, Improving Software Security: A Discussion of Liability for Unreasonably Insecure 
Software, in SECURING PRIVACY IN THE INTERNET AGE 155, 166 (Anapum Chander et al. eds., 2006); Shuba 
Gosh & Vikram Mangalmurti, Curing Cybersecurity Breaches Through Strict Products Liability, in SECURING 
PRIVACY IN THE INTERNET AGE 187, 195; STEWART D. PERSONICK & CYNTHIA A. PATTERSON (eds.), 
CRITICAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION AND THE LAW: AN OVERVIEW OF KEY ISSUES 50 
(2003); David Gripman, The Doors Are Locked but the Thieves and Vandals Are Still Getting In: A Proposal 
in Tort to Alleviate Corporate America’s Cyber-Crime Problem, 16 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 
167, 175 (1997); Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, The Tort Of Negligent Enablement Of Cybercrime, 
20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1553, 1586 (2005) (arguing for recognizing a negligent enablement tort to provide an 
incentive to avoid negligent design practices); Michael D. Scott, Tort Liability for Vendors of Insecure 
Software: Has the Time Finally Come? 67 MD. L. REV. 425, 467 (2008). 
 9. Eugene H. Spafford, Remembrances of Things Pest, 53 COMM. ACM 35, 36 (2010). 
 10. See infra Part III. 
 11. See generally Paul S. Atkins & Bradley J. Bondi, Evaluating the Mission: A Critical Review of the 
History and Evolution of the SEC Enforcement Program, 13 FORDHAM J. OF CORP. & FIN. L. 367, 414 (2008) 
(analyzing the enforcement program of the Securities and Exchange Commission); Robert L. Glicksman & 
Dietrich H. Earnhart, The Comparative Effectiveness of Government Interventions on Environmental 
Performance in the Chemical Industry, 26 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 317, 367 (2007) (analyzing the chemical 
industry’s compliance with federal environmental regulations). 
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In Part I, we define norms generally and explain the special case of 
coordination norms.  We also introduce the concept of a value-optimal norm.  
This concept is required for our central claim: that the sale of mass-produced 
software is not governed by value-optimal norms.  In Part II, we provide the 
background essential to defending this claim.  We argue that product-risk 
norms are coordination norms that ensure that most buyers demand similar 
features in particular types of products.  We offer three examples.  These 
examples illustrate that in mass markets, product-risk norms are coordination 
norms that promote buyers’ interests by unifying their demands.  A mass-
market buyer cannot unilaterally ensure that sellers will conform to his or her 
requirements; instead, coordination norms create collective demands.  In Part 
III, we adapt a well-known law and economics argument to explain why—
under ideal transaction conditions—sellers conform to product-risk norms 
because offering norm-conforming products is the profit-maximizing strategy.  
As we explain in detail in Part III, transaction conditions are ideal when two 
conditions hold: there are enough value-optimal product-risk norms, and the 
market is perfectly competitive.  We argue in Part IV that software sales fail to 
adequately approximate this ideal.  While we address the concern that 
sufficiently competitive markets may not exist, we focus primarily on the lack 
of appropriate value-optimal norms.  We argue that buyers are trapped in a 
product-risk norm that is not value-optimal, and we contend that the solution is 
to replace the current norm with a norm formulated in terms of best practices 
for software development.  Part V defines the notion of a best practice, and 
argues that best practices exist for software development.  Part VI specifies the 
conditions under which a best-practices norm will arise.  In Part VII, we argue 
that legal regulation is required to fulfill these conditions, and we sketch an 
appropriate statute. 
I. NORMS 
We begin by describing the purchase of a typical consumer good.  When 
Alice discovers that her water heater no longer works, she purchases a new 
one.  She takes it for granted that the gas pilot light will not stop burning every 
few days; that the water heater will not burst; that the materials are sufficiently 
corrosion resistant; that the water heater will function properly for about ten 
years; and so on.  Alice does not try to confirm these assumptions.  She does 
not investigate the water heater, its design specifications, or its manufacturing 
process.  She simply assumes that its design and manufacture do not impose 
unacceptable risks (as long as she uses the water heater for its intended 
purpose).  She assumes this because she assumes that the sale of the water 
heater is governed by relevant product-risk norms.  This raises three questions.  
What are the relevant norms?  Why, and in what sense, do norm-compliant 
sales ensure only acceptable risks?  And why do buyers and sellers comply 
with product-risk norms?  Clarifying the relevant notion of a norm is an 
essential preliminary task. 
Product-risk norms are coordination norms.  Coordination norms are one 
important species in the broad genus of norms in general.  We define the genus 
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first.  A norm is a behavioral regularity in a group where the regularity exists at 
least in part because almost everyone thinks that he or she ought to conform to 
the regularity.
12
  Suppose, for example, that the norm in Jones’s small town is 
to go to a Protestant church on Sunday; that is, almost everyone goes to a 
Protestant church on Sunday (even though there is a Catholic church nearby in 
the next town), and almost everyone does so at least in part because almost 
everyone believes he or she ought to go to a Protestant church on Sunday.  As 
the “almost” in “almost everyone” indicates, the existence of a norm does not 
require universal compliance.  We will not consider the interesting question of 
how many count as “almost everyone,” and we will, for convenience, drop the 
“almost” and simply understand “everyone” as “almost everyone.” 
Norms evolve over time through repeated patterns of interaction; the 
interactions may initially have their source in custom, private agreement, or 
law (or a combination of these factors).
13
 To take custom first, it is easy to 
imagine it as the source of the “Protestant church” norm.  Suppose it was 
customary for some part of the town’s population to attend the church; church-
goers and non-church-goers alike notice the custom, and both groups begin to 
think that they ought to conform—either out of religious conviction, or some 
other view of why it is a good thing, or in order to avoid the disapproval of 
others.  Attendees continue to attend while non-attendees increasingly become 
attendees.  To illustrate private agreement, imagine that two years ago Scott 
and Zoe agreed to meet at Starbucks every morning; having done so for two 
years, each thinks he or she ought to meet the other at Starbucks.  The norm of 
driving on the right illustrates the role of legal regulation.  The norm owes its 
existence at least in part to the fact that it is the law that one drives on the right.  
Legal regulation does not, however, always bring a norm into existence; it is 
the law that one should obey speed limits, but the norm is to exceed them.  We 
defer further consideration of the generation of norms to Parts VI and VII.  
Until then, we focus on why people continue to conform to already established 
norms. 
A. Coordination Norms 
We first define coordination norms and then turn to the question—critical 
for our later purposes—of why people conform to coordination norms. 
1. Coordination Norms Defined 
Driving on the right is an example of a coordination norm.  Before 
considering what makes this a coordination norm, note that the general 
definition of the genus is fulfilled: everyone (in the United States) drives on the 
right, and they do so in part because they think they ought to.  Exceptional 
 
 12. See Michael Hechter & Karl-Dieter Opp, What Have We Learned About the Emergence of Social 
Norms?, in SOCIAL NORMS 394, 403 (Michael Hechter & Karl-Dieter Opp eds., 2001) (exploring the varied 
definitions of the term “norm”). 
 13. See DAVID K. LEWIS, CONVENTION: A PHILOSOPHICAL STUDY 5–42 (1969). 
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circumstances aside, no one thinks he or she should drive on the left—as long 
as everyone else drives on the right.  The “as long as” is the distinctive feature 
of the example.  The “ought” is conditional.  Everyone thinks he or she ought 
to drive on the right, but only on the condition that everyone else does so.  If 
everyone started driving on the left, no one would think he or she ought to 
drive on the right.  This conditional “ought” distinguishes driving on right from 
the norms we examined earlier.  In the Protestant church norm, for example, 
each churchgoer expects others to attend, but attendance does not depend on 
that expectation; each attends because each thinks he or she ought to, no matter 
what others do.  “Attend a Protestant church” and “drive on the right” are both 
norms, but they are different species of the same genus; the latter is a 
coordination norm, but the former is not.  A coordination norm is a behavioral 
regularity in a group, where the regularity exists at least in part because almost 
everyone thinks that he or she ought to conform to the regularity, as long as 
everyone else does.
14
  The “ought” is conditioned on the assumption about 
everyone else.  We will need to refer to such “oughts” frequently, and to avoid 
constant repetitions of “as long as everyone else does,” we will often say that, 
for short, that one thinks one ought conditionally to conform. 
An example is helpful.  You are about to enter an elevator in which others 
are already present.  Where do you stand?  The norm is to maximize the 
distance between you and the person nearest you.
15
  Thus, everyone thinks he 
or she ought to conform to the norm—but conditionally, as long as everyone 
else conforms.  There is little point in being the only “nearest neighbor 
distance maximizer” if everyone else is just going to stand wherever they like.  
The example illustrates an important feature of coordination norms: they make 
it possible for parties to coordinate their behavior in ways that realize shared 
interests that none could realize on their own.  The shared interest in the case 
of elevators is finding an acceptable compromise between two goals: using the 
elevator when it arrives, and avoiding unacceptable crowding.  No elevator 
user can strike an acceptable balance on his or her own; others must cooperate 
by standing in appropriate places.  Following the “maximize the distance from 
your nearest neighbor” norm creates the necessary cooperation.
16
  Similar 
 
 14. Our notion of coordination norms is similar to but not as broad as Steven Hetcher’s notion.  See 
generally STEVEN A. HETCHER, NORMS IN A WIRED WORLD 50 (2004) (stating that coordination norms are "a 
pattern of rationally governed behavior maintained by a group in conformity" in order to derive a 
"coordination benefit," but they "need not be a proper coordination equilibrium.").  Our notion is closely 
related to the notion of coordination game in game theory, which has roots going back to THOMAS C. 
SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT (1960) and to David Lewis’ notion of convention.  See LEWIS, supra 
note 13, at 36.  There are important affinities between our notion of a coordination norm and the notion of 
coordination game. The original idea of coordination games and the term “coordination game” comes from 
Schelling.  SCHELLING, supra at 89–90.  The latter notion was further developed and connected to norms and 
conventions by Lewis.  For a more recent treatment, see generally RUSSELL COOPER, COORDINATION GAMES: 
COMPLEMENTARITIES AND MACROECONOMICS (1999) (discussing macroeconomic examples of coordination). 
 15. This is a simplification.  The true norm is closer to “maximize the distance from your nearest 
neighbor subject to the constraint that you stay within the peripheral vision of at least one other passenger and 
that you have at least one other passenger within your peripheral vision.” 
 16. Following the norm is not of course a unique solution to the cooperation problem; there are 
alternatives—e. g., maximize the distance from your nearest neighbor and do not enter unless that distance is 
at least three inches. 
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points hold for driving on the right.  No driver alone can realize the goal of 
everyone driving on the same side of the road.  The norm ensures the necessary 
cooperation. 
2. Why People Conform to Coordination Norms 
A key claim in our analysis is that coordination norms resist change; once 
established, they are self-perpetuating.  To explain why, we need to see why 
people conform to norms.  We begin with non-coordination norms (like the 
Protestant church norm) and then turn to coordination norms. 
People conform to non-coordination norms because, for the most part, 
people do what they sincerely and without reservation think they ought to do.  
Cases of “thinking one ought” form a continuum.  At one extreme, one 
conforms only to avoid sanctions (one may avoid eating one’s meat with one’s 
salad fork only to avoid the disapproval of one’s etiquette-obsessed friends); at 
the other extreme, sanctions play no role in explaining conformity.  One 
conforms because one thinks that conformity realizes a state of affairs one 
regards as good—attending a Protestant church, for example.  In between, 
conformity is a mix, in varying degrees, of both factors.  People in Jone’s 
town, for example, may attend church because they think it is their religious 
duty to do so and because others would disapprove if they failed to attend.  
Across the entire continuum, it is true to say that one thinks one ought to 
conform.  The “ought” is a prudential “ought” at the “conform only to avoid 
sanctions” end, and a non-prudential “ought” at the “conform to realize a good 
state of affairs” end.  Our free use of “ought” may ring false to those who 
assume that people are entirely self-interested.
17
  We do not share the 
assumption, but those who wish to work within its constraints may simply 
interpret our “one ought to do” as “it is in one’s self-interest to do.”  We will 
not make any claims inconsistent with that interpretation.
18
 
We now turn to coordination norms.  The explanation of why people 
conform to non-coordination norms is not adequate as an explanation of why 
they conform to coordination norms.  To see why, recall that coordination 
norms are regularities that exist at least in part because everyone thinks that he 
or she ought to conform conditionally to the regularity. Thus, one will conform 
as long as one expects everyone else to do so.  Our earlier explanation simply 
does not address cases in which one’s convictions about what one ought to do 
depend on one’s expectations about what everyone else will do.  Our 
explanation of conformity to coordination norms is that conformity yields 
mutually concordant expectations about conformity, which yield conformity, 
which yields mutually concordant expectations about conformity, and so on.  
 
 17. The assumption dominates economics and law and economics.  See generally  AMARTYA SEN, THE 
IDEA OF JUSTICE 32–33 (2009); AMARTYA SEN, ON ETHICS AND ECONOMICS 15–28 (1987). Sen extensively 
criticizes the assumption, decisively in our view. See id. (arguing that rational actors do not exclusively act in 
their own self interest at all times). 
 18. Even our observation that one may conform to realize a good state of affairs is consistent as long as 
one sees such motivations as being, in one way or another, in one’s self-interest. 
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In this way, once established, coordination norms are self-perpetuating.  There 
are two questions.  How does conformity yield expectations?  And how do 
expectations yield conformity? 
It is easy to see how conformity yields expectations.  Imagine Alice is 
about to enter an elevator.  Like anyone who has lived long enough in the 
community in which the elevator norm obtains, Alice knows that people 
conform to the norm because think they ought to.
19
  What is true of Alice is 
true of everyone.  Everyone who has lived long enough in the community 
knows that people conform because they think they ought to.  Thus, mutually 
concordant expectations exist: everyone expects everyone to conform. 
Now how do those expectations give rise to conformity?  Start again with 
Alice.  Alice thinks she ought to conform as long as everyone else does so, the 
expectation that everyone else will conform gives her good reason to conform 
when she enters the elevator, and acting on that reason, she will conform.  
Again, everyone is like Alice.  Each person thinks he or she ought to conform 
as long as everyone else does, so the expectation that everyone else will 
conform gives each person a reason to conform, and acting on that reason, each 
will conform.  Thus: conformity yields mutually concordant expectations about 
conformity, which yields conformity. The continuing conformity reinforces the 
mutually concordant expectations about conformity, which yield conformity, 
which reinforces the mutually concordant expectations about conformity, and 
so on.  The process ensures that, once established, coordination norms are 
entrenched self-perpetuating practices.  Our critique of software sales is that 
the “wrong” product-risk coordination norm has become entrenched in 
precisely this self-perpetuating way. 
B. Value-optimal Norms 
The product-risk norm governing software sales is “wrong” in the sense 
that it is not value-optimal.  So what is a value-optimal norm?  To answer, 
consider first that one typically conforms to norms without much thought; 
when you step into an elevator, you just unreflectively stand in the appropriate 
spot.  You think you ought to stand there, but you do not worry or wonder 
about the justification for that “ought.”  You could justify it, however, if you 
reflected on the norm under ideal conditions (including having sufficient time, 
sufficient information, lack of bias, and so on).
20
  You could justify the balance 
the norm strikes between not feeling crowded and being able to use the 
 
 19. For simplicity, we are suppressing interesting issues about the type and extent of knowledge 
required for the existence of a norm.  See LEWIS, supra note 13, at 52–76 (examining the communal 
expectations required for a norm).  Given our discussion, we may legitimately assume that the required 
knowledge conditions are fulfilled. 
 20. The appeal to reasoning under appropriate conditions to justify normative conclusions begins (at 
least) with Aristotle.  See ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 235 (1911) (“And to like and dislike what one 
ought is judged to be most important for the formation of good moral character: because these feelings extend 
all one’s life through, giving a bias towards and exerting an influence on the side of virtue and happiness, since 
men choose what is pleasant and avoid what is painful.”).  For a modern exposition and defense of this 
approach, see STEPHEN L. DARWALL, IMPARTIAL REASON 201–17 (1983) (discussing the normative aspect of 
the reasoning behind a person’s actions). 
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elevator when it arrives.  Roughly speaking, a norm is value-optimal when one 
can, in light of one’s values, justify the norm. 
This is “rough speaking” because justification is a matter of degree.  One 
might, for example, regard the elevator norm as justified but also think that the 
following alternative is even better justified: maximize the distance from your 
nearest neighbor and do not enter the elevator unless that distance is at least 
three inches.  It is essential to take degrees of justification into account to 
arrive at an explanation of value-optimality that will serve our purposes in 
what follows. Thus, we define a value-optimal norm as follows: a coordination 
norm is value-optimal when (and only when), in light of the values of (almost) 
all members of the group in which the norm obtains, the norm is at least as 
well justified as any alternative.  It is the “at least as well justified as any 
alternative” which makes the norm optimal; it means one cannot improve by 
choosing a better justified norm.  There are many optimality notions; Pareto 
optimality is perhaps the most well-known one.
21
  Value-optimality is the 
notion that we need for our analysis. 
Our analysis of software vulnerabilities focuses on a particular type of 
failure of value-optimality.  The following example illustrates the type.  Until 
1979,
22
 hockey players in the National Hockey League did not wear helmets 
despite the clear risk of severe head injury.
23
  There were two disadvantages to 
wearing a helmet: non-helmet-wearing players’ perception that helmet-wearers 
lacked toughness, and a small loss in playing effectiveness against non-helmet-
wearing players from the helmet’s restriction of peripheral vision.
24
  
Nonetheless, had one conducted a secret ballot at the time, the vast majority of 
players would have agreed that it would be better if all players wore helmets.
25
  
“One player summed up the feelings of many: It is foolish not to wear a 
helmet.  But I don’t—because the other guys don’t.  I know that’s silly, but 
most of the other players feel the same way.”
26
  In light of the sanctions, each 
player thought he ought to conform.  The result was that it remained a norm 
not to wear a helmet until 1979, when the league required helmets.
27
  Despite 
its persistence, the “no helmet” norm was not value-optimal.  There was an 
 
 21. A situation is Pareto optimal when and only when it is not possible to improve the well-being of any 
one person without making others worse off.  See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW & ECONOMICS 14 
(Sally Yagan et al. eds., 6th ed. 2011). 
 22. Andrew Podnieks, How Fighting Became So Ferocious, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 15, 2011, 2:48 PM), 
http://slapshot.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/12/15/how-fighting-became-so-ferocious/. 
 23. See Thomas C. Schelling, Hockey Helmets, Concealed Weapons, and Daylight Saving: A Study of 
Binary Choices with Externalities, 17 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 381, 381 (1973) (discussing players’ refusal to wear 
helmets absent a National Hockey League mandate, despite a fellow player’s serious brain injury). 
 24. Id. 
 25. The Economist reports that there really was a secret ballot.  The Economics of Hockey Helmets, 
ECONOMIST (July 19, 2007, 17:08), http://www.economist.com/blogs/freeexchange/2007/07/the_economics_ 
of_hockey_helmet (citing James Surowiecki, Fuel for Thought, NEW YORKER (July 23, 2007), 
http://www.newyorker.com/talk/financial/2007/07/23/070723ta_talk_surowiecki).  We have been unable to 
confirm this report.  Thomas Schelling considers the results of hypothetical choices in THOMAS C. SCHELLING, 
MICROMOTIVES AND MACROBEHAVIOR 198–201 (2d ed. 2006), but he does not consider a secret ballot among 
hockey players. 
 26. Schelling, supra note 23, at 381 (citation omitted). 
 27. Podnieks, supra note 22. 
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alternative the players regarded as far better justified: all players wear helmets. 
This example shows why value-optimality matters.  The no-helmet norm 
defined a tradeoff between the risk of head injury on the one hand, and 
peripheral vision and appearing tough on the other.  When they conformed to 
this norm, the players accepted this tradeoff—even though they regarded 
another norm (all players wear helmets) implementing a different tradeoff 
(reduced risk of head injury) as far better justified.  This is why value-
optimality matters: conformity to a norm that lacks value-optimality means 
acting contrary to one’s values.  We argue in Part V that software buyers are 
trapped in conformity to a product-risk coordination norm that lacks value-
optimality. 
C. Coordination Norms and Coordination Games 
Our notion of coordination norm has strong connections to the notion of a 
coordination game in game theory.
28
  This subsection is not essential to our 
argument, and readers with no taste for technical details may wish to skip the 
discussion.  However, examining the connections with coordination games 
sheds important light on our use of the notion of a value-optimal norm.  We 
assume some basic familiarity with game theory,
29
 and we first briefly recall 
some standard definitions. 
1. Definitions 
In a (normal-form) game, each player has a finite set of actions available.  
Each player simultaneously chooses an action, and the outcome of the game, 
which is a distinct payoff to each player, is determined by the actions chosen.  
A player’s strategy specifies what action he or she will use; a pure strategy is 
the choice of one particular action; a mixed strategy randomizes over two or 
more actions (e.g., if the possible actions are “Left” and “Right,” then one 
mixed strategy is, “Choose Left with probability 1/3; Choose Right with 
probability 2/3”).  A set of one strategy for each player is called a strategy 
profile.  A strategy profile is a Nash equilibrium if each player’s strategy is a 
best possible response to the combined strategies of all the other players.
30
  
Nash’s famous theorem says that every game has at least one mixed-strategy 
Nash equilibrium.
31
  Intuitively we would expect that a game with pure-
strategy Nash equilibria that is played repeatedly will wind up with the players 
settling into one of those equilibria. 
Normal-form games with only two players are typically described by 
giving a payoff matrix that shows the payoffs for all possible actions by the 
 
 28. See COOPER, supra note 14, at viii–x. 
 29. For a good overview of game theory, see, e.g., ROBERT GIBBONS, GAME THEORY FOR APPLIED 
ECONOMISTS 2 (1992); KEVIN LEYTON-BROWN & YOAV SHOHAM, ESSENTIALS OF GAME THEORY: A CONCISE, 
MULTIDISCIPLINARY INTRODUCTION 3 (2008); MARTIN J. OSBORNE & ARIEL RUBINSTEIN, A COURSE IN GAME 
THEORY 11 (1994); PHILIP D. STRAFFIN, GAME THEORY AND STRATEGY 63 (1993). 
 30. OSBORNE & RUBINSTEIN, supra note 29, at 216. 
 31. LEYTON-BROWN & SHOHAM, supra note 29, at 10. 
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players.  For example, for the game of deciding which side of the road to drive 
on, with actions “Left” and “Right” we have: 
 
 Left Right 
Left (10, 10) (0, 0) 
Right (0, 0) (10, 10) 
 Figure 1: The Driving Game (which side of the road?) 
 
In each cell of the matrix, there is a pair of numbers. The left number gives the 
payoff to the player who chooses the row, and the right gives the payoff to the 
player who chooses the column.  Here there are two Nash equilibria, one where 
both players drive on the right and one where both drive on the left. 
Let us say that a game is a coordination game if it has at least two pure-
strategy Nash equilibria where all players choose corresponding actions, and 
no other pure-strategy Nash equilibria.
32
  Our driving game represents the 
purest possible sort of coordination game: both players have the same payoffs 
for every combination of actions, and there are strict Nash equilibria for the 
action profiles consisting of corresponding moves. 
2. Value-optimality and Nash Equilibria 
To see the connection to value-optimality, consider the Stag Hunt 
Game.
33
  Two hunters each have to decide whether to hunt stag together 
(neither can catch a stag alone) or hunt rabbits separately (which they can 
 
 32. To be more precise, we should have said “the actions of the game can be labeled so that it has Nash 
equilibria with the players choosing the corresponding actions,” because two games that become the same 
when the actions (or players) are relabeled are really the same game.  There does not seem to be any one exact 
definition of “coordination game” used uniformly throughout the literature. For instance, we did not specify 
whether the Nash equilibria must be strict, that is, whether “best response” in Nash equilibrium is to be 
defined as “better than all alternatives.” (If it is defined as “at least as good as all other alternatives,” then we 
get weak Nash equilibrium). Some authors impose further conditions that we will not discuss here. 
  We speculate that there is no precise definition because the notion of coordination is of most interest 
in social science and legal communities interested in social norms or situations of mixed cooperation and 
competition, and perhaps of less interest to the mathematical game theory community that tends to be the 
source of strict definitions. Schelling remarks in his Preface to the 1980 edition of THE STRATEGY OF 
CONFLICT, “I wanted to show that some elementary theory, cutting across economics, sociology and political 
science, even law and philosophy and perhaps anthropology, could be useful not only to formal theorists but 
also to people concerned with practical problems. I hoped too, and I now think mistakenly, that the theory of 
games might be redirected toward applications in these several fields. . . . [G]ame theorists have tended to stay 
instead at the mathematical frontier.” SCHELLING, supra note 14, at vi. 
 33. See generally BRIAN SKYRMS, THE STAG HUNT AND THE EVOLUTION OF SOCIAL STRUCTURE 1–13 
(2003) (describing the Stag Hunt game, which “is a prototype of the social contract”). 
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easily catch on their own).
34
  Stags provide a lot more food than whatever 
number of rabbits each could catch alone, and thus each prefers cooperating to 
hunt stags to hunting rabbits alone. Thus the payoff matrix might be: 
 
 Stag Rabbit 
Stag (10, 10) (0, 3) 
Rabbit (3, 0) (3, 3) 
 Figure 2: The Stag Hunt Game 
 
Or perhaps if one hunter is likely to catch extra rabbits if the other hunter is 
(futilely) hunting a stag by himself, it might look like: 
 
 Stag Rabbit 
Stag (10, 10) (0, 5) 
Rabbit (5, 0) (3, 3) 
 Figure 3: Stag Hunt game with slightly different payoffs 
 
The key point is that either way the choice “Rabbit, Rabbit” forms a Nash 
equilibrium.
35
  Each player, if he believes the other player will choose rabbit, 
should himself rationally choose rabbit.
36
  But why would a player believe that 
the other will choose rabbit when they both prefer stag?  Distrust is a sufficient 
reason.  Imagine hunting stag is more difficult and uncertain than hunting 
rabbits.  Each will hunt stag only as long as he or she believes the other will.
37
  
As soon as one of them becomes convinced that the other will desert the stag 
hunt to catch rabbits, he or she too will abandon the stag hunt.  Where there is 
insufficient trust, hunting rabbits will become the norm.
38
  It will be a 
behavioral regularity, and—since it is a Nash equilibrium—each will think he 
 
 34. Id. at 1. 
 35. See id. at 3. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. See id. (stating that rational players “need a measure of trust” to hunt stag instead of rabbits). 
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or she ought to conform as long as the other does.
39
 
The norm is not value-optimal, however. There is another Nash 
equilibrium—stag-stag, and each player believes that that is the best outcome 
and hence believes that the coordinating behavior to achieve this outcome is 
value-optimal.
40
  However, as long as a player believes that the other players 
are going to choose rabbit, then he believes that he too should choose rabbit.
41
 
Indeed, it would not merely be risky but outright foolish to choose stag if one 
knows that the other players will choose rabbit. 
The rabbit norm traps the players in a suboptimal equilibrium.  Our 
notion of a value-optimal norm generalizes this idea beyond the confines of 
game theory.  We will argue shortly that the stag-hunt game corresponds to 
buyers’ choices in buying vulnerability-ridden software, with the rabbit action 
corresponding to settling for defective software, and the stag action 
corresponding to demanding higher-quality software.  Demanding higher-
quality software is the value-optimal alternative, but buyers are trapped in the 
choice of defective software.
42
  It is illuminating in this regard to return to the 
1970s professional hockey players.
43
 
For simplicity, we consider just two players, each representing some 
substantial fraction of all the hockey players. Here we could get two quite 
different games depending on just what assumptions we make about the 
hockey players’ utility. First we might get exactly the same payoff matrix as 
the one in Figure 3 changing only the labels on actions from Stag, Rabbit to 
Helmet, Bare. 
 
 Helmet Bare 
Helmet (10, 10) (0, 5) 
Bare (5, 0) (3, 3) 
 Figure 4: Hockey Helmet Game (as Stag Hunt) 
 
We obtain the payoff matrix in Figure 4 by assuming that players prefer 
helmets to bare heads; and prefer an advantage in winning to an even game; 
and prefer an even game to being at a disadvantage.
44
  However, another 
 
 39. See id. at 10 (“[W]hat a rational player in the stag hunt will do depends on what the player thinks the 
other will do.”). 
 40. Id. at 3. 
 41. Id. 
 42. See infra Part IV. 
 43. See supra notes 22–27 and accompanying text. 
 44. To be precise, we obtain the payoff matrix shown by assuming that having a helmet is worth 7 units 
of utility, being bare-headed is worth 0, having an advantage in winning is worth 5, being in a neutral position 
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plausible set of assumptions about the hockey players’ preferences gives us the 
famous Prisoners’ Dilemma game.
45
 We need assume only that their 
preference for an advantage in winning the game is larger than any preference 




 Helmet Bare 
Helmet (5, 5) (0, 10) 
Bare (10, 0) (3, 3) 
 Figure 5: Hockey Helmet Game (as Prisoner’s Dilemma) 
 
The two payoff matrices look quite similar, but there is a very important 
difference. For the Stag-hunt version of the hockey helmet game, there are in 
fact two Nash equilibria, and if everybody in the league is playing bare-
headed, then we have a difficult but potentially solvable problem: how do we 
move to the other Nash equilibrium, or in our terms, how do we move from the 
norm that is not value-optimal to the norm that is value-optimal?  However, in 
the Prisoner’s Dilemma version, there is only one Nash equilibrium, the low-
payoff one at Bare, Bare paying 3 to each player. 
Our use of value-optimality generalizes this game-theoretic theme from 
coordination games to coordination norms.  When a norm lacks value-
optimality, there is (at least) one other alternative norm that is better justified; 
in game theoretic terms, there are—so to speak—(at least) two Nash equilibria, 
one of which all players prefer to the other.  The “so to speak” qualification is 
essential. We have defined coordination games only for two-player 
interactions; the parties to the norms we consider typically number in the 
millions.  Still, we think that the coordination games offer mathematically 
precise model that illuminates the broader phenomenon of value-optimality in 
the case of coordination norms. 
II. PRODUCT-RISK NORMS 
Typically, product sales are governed by (more or less) value-optimal 
 
for winning is worth 0, and being at a disadvantage is worth -7, and that the preferences are independent and 
can be added. 
 45. For an excellent, detailed discussion of the prisoner’s dilemma, see WILLIAM POUNDSTONE, 
PRISONER’S DILEMMA 101–31 (1992). 
 46. Figure 5‘s payoff matrix is based on the assumption that the utilities for an advantage in winning, an 
even game, and a disadvantage are respectively 10, 3, and -2, and the independent utility for having a helmet is 
2. 
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norms.  In Section IV, we argue that software sales are not governed by an 
appropriate value-optimal product-risk, and thus are an aberration from the 
typical pattern.  In this section, we illustrate the typical pattern with three 
examples. 
Each example is a coordination norm that allocates the burden of 
avoiding losses.  Sellers bear whatever investment is required to produce 
norm-conforming products while buyers bear the risks of loss from using a 
norm-conforming product (unless those risks are assigned to the seller by other 
norms, by law, or by contract).  We have deliberately chosen examples that 
may appear to govern the allocation of risks of unauthorized access due to 
software vulnerabilities.  We argue in Part IV that they do not.  The argument 
rests on the following point, which we emphasize in the discussion of the 
examples: one applies product-risk norms against a background of shared 
judgments about the proper allocation of risk in particular cases.  The relevant 
shared judgments in the case of software sales assign the vulnerability-created 
risk of unauthorized access in ways inconsistent with the examples, and indeed 
in ways generally inconsistent with product-risk norms governing non-
software sales. 
One preliminary question remains: who are the parties to the norms?  The 
answer may seem obvious—buyers and sellers; after all, they need to 
coordinate so that sellers offer what buyers want to buy.  Further, if the norms 
are to allocate risks between buyers and sellers, how could both not be parties 
to the norm?  It is indeed possible to represent product-risk norms as buyer-
seller coordination norms; however, it is also possible, and simpler and more 
elegant, to model the norms as norms to which the only parties are buyers.  The 
key point is that sellers design mass-software in response to sufficiently large 
groups of buyers; hence, no buyer can unilaterally ensure that his or her 
desired level of risk will be available—only a sufficiently large collective 
demand can accomplish that.  Coordination via product-risk norms creates the 
required collective demand, to which profit-motive driven sellers respond.  
Since the profit motive is sufficient to ensure the sellers’ response, there is no 
need to see the sellers as a party to the coordination norm.
47
 
A. The “Fitness” Norm 
The norm is that buyers “demand” products that are fit for the ordinary 
purpose for which such products are used.  We use “demand” here in the 
following sense: “demand a fit product and (other things being equal)
48
 refuse 
to buy an unfit product.”  We will use “demand” in this “demand and refuse to 
buy” sense throughout in our discussion of product-risk norms. 
There is no doubt that the “fitness” norm is indeed a norm.  The required 
 
 47. See infra Part III. 
 48. The “other things being equal” is merely to handle exceptions that do not matter for our purposes—
e. g., a buyer may accept an unfit product if he or she has a non-standard use for it, or if the seller is a relative 
from whom the buyer believes he must not refuse. 
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regularity exists: buyers do demand fit products.
49
  Moreover, they think they 
ought to do so—conditionally.  As long as everyone conforms, non-conformity 
would mean unilaterally demanding an unfit product.  The demand would go 
unfulfilled, and the non-conforming buyer would forego the purchase of the 
product.  To the extent that doing so is unacceptable, the buyer will think he or 
she ought to conform.  Of course, if enough buyers were interested in 
purchasing “unfit” products, seller would begin to offer them (other things 
being equal), and a new “fitness” norm would develop to govern those sales; 
products “fit” under the new norm would not be “fit” under the old one. 
Varying notions of fitness are possible because “fitness” is determined by 
contextually-sensitive normative judgments.  It could hardly be otherwise.  
Fitness depends on the type of product, the circumstances in which it is 
ordinarily used, the knowledge and skill of typical buyers, and the values in 
light of which buyers evaluate the product.
50
  In a significant range of cases, 
there is sufficient overlap in values, use, knowledge, and skill that buyers 
converge on roughly the same judgments of fitness in particular cases.  Lindy 
Homes, Inc. v. Evans Supply Co., Inc.
51
 is an excellent example, even though it 
does not concern the fitness norm (at least not directly).  The case concerns the 
Implied Warranty of Merchantability, which is asserted in Uniform 
Commercial Code section 2-314(2)(c).
52
  Under that provision, a seller 
warrants that the goods are fit for the ordinary purpose for which such goods 
are used.
53
  The task before the court was to determine fitness. 
Lindy Homes used electrogalvanized sixpenny casing nails in cedar 
plywood siding.
54
  Electrogalvanized nails rust when used in cedar; nails 
galvanized by a different process—“hot-dipped”—are far more rust-resistant, 
and the standard practice in the construction industry is to use hot-dipped nails 
in cedar.
55
  When the electrogalvanized nails rusted, Lindy Homes sued the 
 
 49. The demand has a long history.  As British common law responded to the rise of a market economy 
in the seventeenth century, it explicitly noted that the commercial custom and practice was to offer fit 
products.  Such acknowledgments, moreover, are not confined to modern market economies; Ancient Roman 
law also notes the same custom and practice. See JAMES OLDHAM, ENGLISH COMMON LAW IN THE AGE OF 
MANSFIELD 79–205 (2004); Friedrich Kessler, The Protection of the Consumer Under Modern Sales Law, Part 
1, 74 YALE L.J. 262. 263–64 (1974); George L. Priest, A Theory Of The Consumer Product Warranty, 90 
YALE L.J. 1297, 1299–1302 (1981). The existence of the demand is consistent with spectacular failures to meet 
it.  For example, in June 2010, in just a small fraction of the recalls that month, “McDonald’s asked customers 
to return 12 million glasses emblazoned with the character Shrek. Kellogg’s warned consumers to stop eating 
28 million boxes of Froot Loops and other cereals. Campbell Soup asked the public to return 15 million 
pounds of SpaghettiOs, and seven companies recalled 2 million cribs.”  Lindsay Layton, A Slew of Defective 
Products Leaves Consumers with ‘Recall Fatigue,’ SEATTLE TIMES, July 3, 2010, 
http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/nationworld/2012268615_recallfatigue03.html. 
 50. U.C.C. § 2–314(2)(c) (2011). 
 51. See Lindy Homes, Inc. v. Evans Supply Co., Inc., 357 So. 2d 996, 999 (Ala. Civ. App. 1978) 
(finding no breach of implied warranty because buyer could not prove the nails were not “fit for the ordinary 
purpose for which such goods are used”). 
 52. U.C.C. § 2–314(2)(c). 
 53. Id.  The norm and the legal rule are not the same; people generally know and adhere to the norm 
while only the relatively legally sophisticated are aware of U.C.C. § 2-314(2)(c). 
 54. Lindy Homes, 357 So.2d at 998. 
 55. Id. at 999. 
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seller, Evans Supply, for breach of the implied warranty of merchantability.
56
  
The court held that the electrogalvanized nails were fit for the ordinary use 
made of them, a use that did not include their use in cedar.
57
  The court relied 
on the industry-wide normative judgment it was “common knowledge in the 
trade that galvanized casing nails should not be used in exterior siding because 
a . . . ‘hot-dipped’ galvanized nail is proper in such a condition.”
58
 
We have not argued that the “fitness” norm is value-optimal, but we take 
the point to be sufficiently plausible that we may, for purposes of illustration, 
assume it is.  We make the same assumption about the next two examples. 
B. The “Negligent Design/Manufacture” Norm 
The norm is that buyers demand products that do not, as a result of 
negligent design or manufacture, impose an unreasonable risk of loss on 
buyers who use the product as intended.  The relevant regularity exists: buyers 
demand such products,
59
 and moreover, buyers think they ought conditionally 
to demand such products.  The argument is essentially the same as in the case 
of the “fitness” norm.  A buyer who had an unusual use for a particular product 
might not care whether the intended uses of the product imposed an 
unreasonable risk of loss; however, as long as everyone else conforms, such a 
buyer will think he or she ought to conform.  Non-conformity would mean 
unilaterally demanding a norm-deviant product; this demand would go 
unfulfilled, and the buyer would forego the purchase of the product.  To the 
extent that going without is unacceptable, such a buyer will think he or she 
ought conditionally to conform.  As with the fitness norm, if enough buyers 
were interested in purchasing “unreasonably risky” products for an alternate 
use, seller would begin to offer them (other things being equal), and a new 
“negligent design/manufacture” norm would develop to govern those sales; 
products not “unreasonably risky” under the new norm might still be 
“reasonably risky” for the range of uses governed under the old norm. 
Applying a “negligent design/manufacture” norm requires making two 
context-sensitive, fact-specific judgments: one about unreasonable safety and 
one about negligent design or manufacture. In re Sony BMG Music 
Entertainment is an excellent illustration.
60
  Part of its merit is that it concerns 
software.  The example illustrates that the norms we discuss in this section do 
indeed govern some aspects of software; our claim, which we defend in Part 
IV, is that the norms do not apply to risks arising from software 
 
 56. Id. at 997. 
 57. Id. at 999. 
 58. Id. 
 59. People clearly do think that sellers ought not to offer products that, as a result of negligent design, 
impose an unreasonable risk of loss on buyers who use the product in the intended way.  It is difficult to 
imagine anyone sincerely claiming that sellers ought to offer such negligently designed products, and indeed 
precisely the opposite conviction plays a central role in the development of products liability law.  See, e.g., 
Richard Wright, The Principles of Products Liability, 26 REV. LITIG.1067, 1070 (2007). 
 60. Sony BMG Music Entm’t, FTC File No. 062-3019 (July 17, 2007), http://www.ftc.gov/os/ 
caselist/0623019/index.shtm. 




Between 2003 and 2005, Sony BMG Music Entertainment sold over 14 
million music CDs containing one of two copy protection programs—XCP or 
MediaMax.
62
  The programs allowed users to make only three physical copies 
of the CD, limited the ability to transfer files from the CD to other devices 
(including the iPod), allowed Sony to monitor users’ listening habits, and were 
extremely difficult to uninstall.
63
  Buyers were not given adequate notice of 
these aspects of the software.
64
  Thus, using the CDs imposed the following 
largely undisclosed risks: interference with plans to make more than three 
copies, interference with plans to play files on other devices, and the invasion 
of privacy by monitoring buyers’ listening habits.  Buyers found these risks 
unreasonable: 
Once the public became aware of the [risks] . . . CDs distributed with 
[the software] . . . experienced a steep drop-off in sales within some 
market segments. . . .  In addition, Sony BMG spent millions to settle 
the steady stream of lawsuits arising out of the . . . incident. Less 
quantifiably, the resulting backlash from artists and customers 




The unreasonableness judgments are fact-specific, context-sensitive 
judgments about the number of times it is reasonable to expect to copy music 
from a CD to other devices, about what sorts of devices it is reasonable to copy 
to, and about the legitimacy of monitoring music listening habits. 
Fact-specific, context-sensitive judgments are also the basis of the 
determination that Sony’s actions were negligent.  It is a standard practice in 
the music CD business to conduct a pre-release review of copy protection 
software to determine whether it works acceptably.
66
  Sony BMG certainly had 
the resources to conduct such a review.
67
  If it did so, it did so negligently; it 
should have discovered the flaws in the software.
68
  Sony might instead have 
relied on the expertise of the suppliers of First4Internet (XCP) and SunnComm 
 
 61. The software in Sony BMG did contain vulnerabilities.  See Deirdre K. Mulligan & Aaron K. 
Perzanowski, The Magnificence of the Disaster: Reconstructing The Sony BMG Rootkit Incident, 22 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1157, 1166 (2007).  Our discussion focuses exclusively on other aspects of the software. 
 62. Complaint at ¶3, Sony BMG Music Entm’t, FTC File No. 062-3019 (Jun. 28, 2007) (No. C-4195), 
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0623019/ 0623019cmp070629.pdf. 
 63. See Bruce Schneier, Sony’s DRM Rootkit: The Real Story, SCHNEIER ON SECURITY (Nov. 17, 2005), 
http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2005/11/sonys_drm_rootk.html. 
 64. Mulligan & Perzanowski, supra note 61, at 1168. 
 65. Id. at 1168–69.  As a result of the ensuing consumer outrage, Sony lost roughly $6.5 million in 
return fees and manufacturing costs alone.  Id. at 1170. 
 66. Id. at 1179. 
 67. The resources to conduct such a review were available to Sony BMG from Sony Corporation of 
America, which has a 50% interest in Sony BMG whose holdings include Sony Electronics and Sony 
Computer Entertainment America.  Id.  Sony, along with Philips, owns the rights to the core DRM patents of 
Intertrust. In theory, at least, Sony BMG could have implemented a suite of better technical solutions.  See 
Press Release, Sony Corp., Philips and Sony Lead Acquisition of Intertrust (Nov. 13, 2002), available at 
http://www.sony.com/SCA/press/021113.shtml. 
 68. Sony’s “decision [to offer the CDs with the copy protection software] points to a culpable failure of 
internal procedures to safeguard against the wide-scale distribution of flawed protection measures.”  Mulligan 
& Perzanowski, supra note 61, at 1178–79. 
64 JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & POLICY [Vol. 2012 
(MediaMax), but such reliance would clearly have been culpable.
69
  
First4Internet’s expertise was in content filtering technology, particularly the 
recognition of pornographic images; it had virtually no experience in copy 
protection technology.
70
  SunnComm was no better.  It began as a provider of 
Elvis impersonation services and had the lack of business savvy and 
technological insight to purchase a 3.5” floppy disk factory in 2001.  It had 
virtually no relevant experience with copy protection software prior to entering 
the contract with Sony.
71
 
C. The Least-Cost Avoider Norm 
The norm is that, other things being equal, buyers demand products that 
assign the risk of a loss to the party that can most cost-effectively prevent or 
remedy the loss—the least cost-avoider.
72
  Car buyers rather than sellers, for 
example, bear losses for failure to change the oil sufficiently often, since the 
buyers are in possession of the car and are the ones who can most easily keep 
track of mileage.  Another example: in the case of refrigerators, sellers are 
liable for defects in the motor while buyers are liable for wear and tear on the 
shelves and doors.  The least-cost avoider is the seller in regard to motor 
defects because it has more expertise and benefits from economies of scale; the 
buyer, on the other hand, is the least-cost avoider in regard to damage to the 




To see that the least-cost avoider norm really is a norm, consider that 
allocating risks to the least-cost avoider yields a net savings overall.  Widely 
shared values dictate that, other things being equal, one should realize such 
savings when one can.  Thus, everyone thinks he or she ought conditionally to 
conform.  Non-conformity would mean unilaterally demanding something else; 
the demand would go unfulfilled, and the buyer would forego the purchase of 
the product.  Thus, the requirements for the existence of a coordination norm 
are fulfilled.  The required regularity exists—buyers demand products in which 
the risks of use are allocated to the least cost-avoider; moreover, the regularity 
exists because buyers think they ought conditionally to conform. 
One applies the least-cost avoider in light of fact-specific, context-
sensitive judgments.  Applying the least-cost avoider norm requires making 
fact-specific, context-sensitive tradeoffs between the least-cost avoider bearing 
losses and potentially conflicting goals.  The reason is that, under the norm, the 
least-cost avoider bears relevant losses, other things being equal.  “Other 
things” are not “equal” when imposing losses on the least-cost avoider 
 
 69. Id. at 1179–80. 
 70. Id. at 1180. 
 71. Id. 
 72. See generally GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 
136 (1970); Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 11 (1960). 
 73. Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Imperfect Information in Markets for Contract Terms: The 
Examples of Warranties and Security Interests, 69 VA. L. REV. 1387, 1398 (1983). 
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unacceptably conflicts with other goals.
74
  The norm assigns a risk of loss to 
the least-cost avoider when and only when there are no unacceptable conflicts 
with other goals. 
D. Norm-Implemented Tradeoffs 
In each of the above examples, the norm implements tradeoffs among 
competing goals.  A norm-conforming seller must make tradeoffs because the 
greater the seller’s investment of time, effort, and money in creating norm-
conforming products, the less is available for pursing other goals.  The tradeoff 
for norm-conforming buyers comes from bearing the risk of using norm-
conforming products.  They must invest in precautions to avoid those losses 
and spend the time, effort, and money to recover from losses they fail to avoid.  
The more they invest, the less they have for other pursuits. 
E. A New Definition of Value-Optimal Norms 
These points about tradeoffs allow us, in the case of product-risk norms, 
to replace our earlier, general definition of value-optimality with one that is 
equivalent but more informative.  The earlier definition was that a norm is 
value-optimal when and only when it is at least as well justified as any 
alternative.  In the case of product-risk norms, we can replace this general 
criterion with: a product-risk norm is value-optimal when and only when the 
tradeoffs it implements are as least as well justified as any alternative.  We 
argue in Part IV that the norm governing software sales is not value-optimal 
because there is an alternative norm that implements a better justified tradeoff. 
Car buyers rather than sellers, for example, bear losses for failure to 
change the oil often enough, because the buyers are in possession of the car 
and are the ones who can most easily keep track of mileage.  Another example: 
in the case of refrigerators, sellers are liable for defects in the motor, while 
buyers are liable for wear and tear on the shelves and doors.  The least-cost 
avoider is the seller in regard to motor defects because it has more expertise 
and benefits from economies of scale; the buyer, on the other hand, is the least-
cost avoider in regard to damage to the motor, doors, and shelves since the 
buyer may avoid damage simply by careful use.
75
 
We turn now to the question: why—and in what sense—do norm-
compliant sales ensure only acceptable risks?  We begin with the “in what 
sense” part of the question.  What do we mean by “acceptable”? 
III. ACCEPTABLE RISK AND IDEAL TRANSACTION CONDITIONS 
We define acceptable as follows: product-risk norms ensure that the 
 
 74. One may, for example, think that someone who commits an intentional tort should bear the losses he 
or she causes even if the victim is the least cost-avoider.  See generally Wright, supra note 59, at 1099–1103. 
 75. See Schwartz & Wilde, supra note 73, at 1398 (using refrigerators as an illustration of how 
comparative advantage determines warranty content). 
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design and manufacture of a product imposes only acceptable risks (when and 
only when the norm is value-optimal).  To see the rationale, suppose you had a 
choice between various norms.  How would you choose?  You would choose 
the norm (or in the case of ties, one of the norms) best justified in light of your 
values.  Our definition of “acceptable” simply acknowledges this fact.  But one 
may rightly object, what if there are not enough value-optimal norms?  
Product-risk norms are paired with particular risks.  The “fitness” norm, for 
example, addresses the risk of using unfit products but not risk of using a 
negligently designed or manufactured product.  Instead the “negligent 
design/manufacture” norm addresses that risk.  Product-risk norms cannot 
ensure acceptable risks when there are significant risks that are not addressed 
by at least one value-optimal product-risk norm. 
Our solution is to introduce the first of the two assumptions 
characterizing ideal transaction conditions.  The first is that there is no 
significant risk that is not governed by at least one value-optimal product-risk 
norm.  Call this norm completeness.
76
  Norm completeness defines an ideal 
that practice only approximates.  Practice tends to approximate norm 
completeness because sellers and buyers have exchanged products for 
centuries, and over the years, relevant value-optimal norms have evolved.  In 
Part V, we argue that software sales are an aberration that falls unacceptably 
short of the ideal of norm completeness. 
Norm completeness guarantees that enough product-risk norms exist, but 
it does not guarantee that sellers will conform to the norms.  Indeed, product-
risk norms would appear to make buyers an easy target for exploitation.  
Norm-conforming buyers typically do not investigate products in any detail; 
they simply take it for granted that products do not impose any unacceptable 
risks as a result of their design and manufacture.  So would sellers exploit that 
fact to sell products that do impose such risks when doing so maximizes 
profits? 
Our answer is to introduce the second assumption characterizing ideal 
transaction conditions: the assumption of a perfectly norm-competitive market 
(discussed below).  When both assumptions hold, the profit-maximizing 
strategy is for sellers to conform to product-risk norms.  It is the profit-
maximizing strategy in practice—to the extent practice approximates ideal 
transaction conditions.  Our argument adapts a well-known law and economics 
argument.
77
  We begin with a summary of the argument: (1) whenever a 
business violates a norm, at least some consumers will notice; (2) consumers 
who detect a norm-violation will not, other things being equal, buy from norm-
inconsistent businesses; (3) businesses are unable to discriminate between 
 
 76. We will, for simplicity, assume that consistency with norms is an all-or-nothing matter: a transaction 
is either entirely consistent, or entirely inconsistent.  In practice, consistency is often a matter of degree.  
Similarly, in regard to value-optimality, we assume that one’s values show either that one ought to act in 
accord with a given norm, or that one ought not.  In practice, there may be open questions where one’s values 
do not show that one ought to act in accord with the norm but also do not show that one ought not. 
 77. The argument is adapted from Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Intervening in Markets on the Basis 
of Imperfect Information: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 630, 640 (1979), which 
discusses the profit-maximizing strategy of businesses in more detail. 
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consumers who will, and those who will not, detect a norm-inconsistency; (4) 
therefore, in a perfectly norm-competitive market, the profit-maximizing 
strategy is for businesses to conform to norms. 
A. Detecting Norm Violations 
It is quite unlikely that norm-inconsistent products will escape the notice 
of every buyer.  Awareness of norm-inconsistent products can come from news 
reports, magazine articles, books, consumer watch-dog groups,
78
 negative 
publicity from consumer complaints, and litigation.  This is not to make any 
claim about how many buyers detect norm-violations. It is the second 
assumption, formulated later, that includes such a claim. 
B. Norm-Violation Detectors versus Norm-Inconsistent Sellers 
When buyers detect norm-inconsistent sellers, they will not—other things 
being equal—buy from them.  Consider that a norm is a regularity to which 
one thinks one ought to conform.  Norm-violation detectors will therefore 
perceive a norm-inconsistent seller as not treating them as they ought to be 
treated.  Other things being equal, buyers will purchase from sellers they 
perceive as treating them as they ought to be treated, not from those whom 
they perceive as not doing so.
79
 
C. Sellers’ Inability to Discriminate 
If sellers could reliably discriminate between buyers who will, and those 
who will not detect a norm-inconsistency, they could remain norm-consistent 
in the case of inconsistency-detectors but violate norms for the rest.  Sellers 
can in some cases spot those buyers that are likely to detect violations of 
norms. They can easily identify repeat customers who have objected to 
violations in the past, and it would not take too much research to identify a 
customer as, for example, the President of a consumer protection group like 
Consumer Reports.  Such cases aside, when you walk into a retail store or 
order an item over the phone or online, nothing reliably signals whether you 
will detect norm-inconsistent behavior.
80
 
D. The Profit-Maximizing Strategy 
The final claim is that when sellers cannot discriminate between those 
who do and those who do not detect norm-inconsistencies, then in a perfectly 
norm-competitive market, the profit-maximizing strategy is to conform to 
 
 78. See, e.g., Robert A. Hillman, Online Boilerplate: Would Mandatory Website Disclosure of E-
Standard Terms Backfire?, 104 MICH. L. REV. 837, 853 (2006) (discussing the role of watchdog groups). 
 79. See, e.g., J. R. Avrill, Studies on Anger and Aggression, 38 AM. PSYCHOL. 1145, 1149 (1983) 
(noting that violation of norms in an exchange provokes anger and may lead to the termination of the 
exchange). 
 80. You may, of course, reveal yourself as an inconsistency-detector if you explicitly insist on norm-
consistent treatment, or if you detect and object to norm-inconsistent behavior. 
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product-risk norms; hence, rational, profit-motive driven sellers will do so.  
The assumption of a perfectly norm-competitive market is the second 
idealizing assumption.  In Part V, we consider the extent to which software 
markets approximate this ideal. 
 When is a market perfectly norm-competitive?  Two conditions must 
hold.  The first is standard economic notion of perfect competition.
81
  We 
define competition as perfect when and only when five conditions hold
82
:  
1. Profit-motive Driven Sellers.  Businesses seek to maximize profit.
83
 
2. Lack of Market Power.  Neither sellers nor buyers can individually 
control the price or determine the features of a product or service.
84
 
3. Homogeneous Products and Services.  The products and services 
involved in pay-with-data exchanges are quite diverse, but the 
homogeneity that matters for us is that they are all pay-with-data 
exchanges.  The relevant similarity is in the mechanism of the sale, not 
the items sold.  The argument we offer works for all pay-with-data 
exchanges, no matter what is exchanged, so we our references below 
to “products and services” are to any particular product or service 
involved in a pay-with-data exchange. 
4. Zero Transaction Costs.  Competitors may costlessly enter and 
leave the market, and buyers can costlessly switch from one seller to 
another.   
5. Perfect Information. The perfect information requirement takes 
various forms.
85
 Minimally, buyers and sellers know all prices.  Most 
generally, all buyers and sellers are assumed know everything relevant 
to their production and consumption decisions.
86
 
The second condition adds to the knowledge specified in (5).  To 
formulate the condition, recall the point made above: buyers will, other things 
being equal, not buy from a seller who violates product risk norms.  The 
second condition is that there are enough buyers who know when norm 
violations occur.  More precisely: there are enough norm-violation-detecting 
buyers that a seller’s gain from norm-inconsistent behavior is smaller than the 
loss which results when norm-violation-detectors buy from norm-consistent 
sellers.  We will need a name for this requirement.  Call it the sufficient 
 
 81. See, e.g., JEFFREY L. HARRISON, LAW & ECONOMICS: POSITIVE, NORMATIVE AND BEHAVIORAL 
PERSPECTIVES 24–25 (2d ed. 2007) (discussing perfect and non-perfect competition). 
 82. Our definition follows a standard pattern.  See WALTER NICHOLSON & CHRISTOPHER SNYDER, 
MICROECONOMIC THEORY: BASIC PRINCIPLES AND EXTENSIONS 415 (2012).  
 83. Id. 
 84. Definitions often substitute the requirement that there be a large number of sellers and buyers; the 
point, however, is to make the size of the market sufficient to ensure that no one seller or buyer has the power 
to set prices and determine features. 
 85. Some definitions of perfect competition omit any mention of perfect information. See Scott A. 
Beaulier & Wm. Stewart Mounts, Jr., Asymmetric Information about Perfect Competition: The Treatment of 
Perfect Information in Introductory Economics Textbooks 1–3 (Sept. 2008), available at 
www.scottbeaulier.com/Information_Version_2.doc. We include it in our definition because appeals to perfect 
information (and real world approximations to it) play a central explanatory role for us. 
 86. See id. at 4–5.   
 86. See id. at 4–5.   
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detection requirement. 
Together perfect competition and sufficient detection entail that the 
profit-maximizing strategy is to be a norm-consistent seller.  Perfect 
competition ensures that every norm-violation detecting buyer will buy from 
norm-consistent sellers, if at least one such seller exists.  Sufficient detection 
ensures that there are enough norm-violation-detecting buyers that norm-
inconsistent sellers lose more than they gain.  Thus, the profit-maximizing 
strategy is to be a norm-consistent seller; hence, rational profit-motive driven 
sellers will be norm-consistent.
87
 
E. Summary of the Product-Risk Norms Model 
The model makes two idealizations.  The first is the assumption of norm-
completeness; the second is the assumption of a norm-competitive market.  
Norm completeness ensures that every purchase is governed by value-optimal 
product-risk norms; perfect norm-competitiveness ensures that rational, profit-
motive driven sellers conform to the norms.  When both assumptions hold, 
product sales are governed by norms that implement acceptable tradeoffs— 
tradeoffs to which buyers give free and informed consent.  These assumptions 
define an ideal that is only approximated in practice.  The closer practices 
come to the ideal, the more product sales involve acceptable tradeoffs to which 
buyers consent. 
We argue next that software sales fall unacceptably far short of this ideal. 
IV. APPLYING THE MODEL TO SOFTWARE VULNERABILITIES 
In this section, we focus exclusively on the failure to approximate norm-
completeness.  We consider perfect norm-competitiveness in Part VI.  Norm-
completeness requires that every significant risk be allocated by at least one 
value-optimal norm.  There are two ways to fail to meet this requirement.  
Norms may not exist, or existing norms may not be value-optimal.  We claim 
that software sales exhibit the latter sort of failure: sales are governed by a 
norm that is not value-optimal.  Our argument is divided into three parts.  We 
first identify the norm.  We then explain why, appearances to the contrary, the 
earlier examples of product-risk norms do not apply.  Finally, we argue that the 
norm is not value-optimal. 
A. The “Vulnerability-Ridden” Norm 
The “vulnerability-ridden” norm is that buyers demand vulnerability-
ridden software.  The required regularity obtains—buyers do demand such 
software.  It is commonplace to complain that buyers are unwilling to pay a 
premium for more secure software; they demand quick-to-market, cheap, 
 
 87. We assume that sellers, as members of the community in which the norm obtains, are aware of the 
norms and realize that they fail to meet buyers’ demands when they fail to act in accordance with demand–
unifying coordination norms.  See supra note 19. 
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vulnerability-ridden software.
88
  The explanation of the existence of the 
regularity is that buyers think that they ought conditionally to demand such 
software.  Thus, the conditions for the existence of a demand-unifying product-
risk norm are fulfilled: buyers regularly demand vulnerability-ridden software, 
and they do so at least in part because they think they ought conditionally to do 
so. To see that buyers think they ought conditionally to demand vulnerability-
ridden software, divide buyers into three groups: buyers ignorant of the 
relevant risks, buyers who are aware of the risks but underestimate them, and 
those who are aware of the risks and accurately estimate them.  In each group, 
buyers think they ought conditionally to demand vulnerability-ridden software, 
but they think so for different reasons. 
Group One: Ignorance.  Many buyers lack relevant information; security 
experts, consumer advocates, and those who make or seek to influence public 
policy may understand the risks involved in using vulnerability-ridden 
software, but many users have at best a minimal understanding.
89
  Since they 
are unaware of the risks, the buyers do not see why they should pay a premium 
for more secure software; hence, they think they ought conditionally to 
demand quick-to-market, cheap, vulnerability-ridden software.  The “ought” is 
conditional because a buyer would change his or her mind if all other buyers 
demanded secure software. An isolated demand for vulnerability-ridden 
software would go unmet. 
Group Two: Underestimation.  Buyers may be aware of the risks but 
underestimate them.  “An amazingly robust finding about human actors . . . is 
that people are often unrealistically optimistic about the probability that bad 
things will happen to them.”
90
  Like buyers who are simply unaware of the 
risk, risk-underestimating buyers do not see why they should pay more for 
secure software, and thus think they ought conditionally to demand quick-to-
market, cheap, vulnerability-ridden software. 
Group Three: Compelling Reason.  Even when buyers correctly estimate 
the risks, they will still think they ought to demand vulnerability-ridden 
software.  Imagine Alice deciding whether to use the Adobe Acrobat Reader; 
she is well aware that the Reader has significant vulnerabilities,
91
 but given the 
“vulnerability-ridden” norm, she has only two options: use the Reader or not.  
 
 88. See MARK G. GRAFF & KENNETH R. VAN WYK, SECURE CODING: PRINCIPLES & PRACTICES 28 
(2003); Douglas A. Barnes, Note, Deworming the Internet, 83 TEX. L. REV. 279, 297–99 (2004). 
 89. See Bruce Schneier, Insider Threat Statistics, SCHNEIER ON SECURITY (Dec. 19, 2005), 
http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2005/12/insider_threat.html (reporting that among corporate 
employees, “[t]wo thirds (62%) admitted they have a very limited knowledge of IT Security” and “[m]ore than 
half (51%) had no idea how to update the anti-virus protection on their company PC”).  See also Consumer 
Labeling for Software Security, SANS INST. INFOSEC READING ROOM, http://www.sans.org/reading_room/ 
whitepapers/awareness/consumer-labeling-software-security_10 (last visited Jan. 17, 2012) (stating that naïve 
consumers are uninformed of the risks involved with insufficient computer security).  Consumer awareness has 
increased over time.  Tim Wilson, Consumer Awareness Of Online Threats Is Up, Study Says, DARK READING 
(Jan. 25, 2010, 8:54 AM), http://www.darkreading.com/security/vulnerabilities/222400407/index.html. 
 90. Christine Jolls, Behavioral Economics Analysis of Redistributive Legal Rules, 51 VAND. L. REV. 
1653, 1659 (1998). 
 91. See Joel Yonts, PDF Malware Overview, SANS INST. (July 19, 2010), http://www.sans.org/security-
resources/malwarefaq/pdf-overview.php (showing the history of vulnerabilities discovered in Adobe Acrobat 
Reader). 
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There is no third option of unilaterally demanding and receiving a less 
vulnerable Reader.  She will think she ought to conditionally use the Reader as 
long as she is confident that she can take reasonable precautions to protect 
herself from unauthorized access.  She realizes that, to the extent she 
transmits .pdf files to others who may not exercise the care she does, she 
imposes on them risks of unauthorized access by giving them yet one more 
occasion to use the Reader.  But such third party risks have virtually no impact 
on her decision; given the extremely widespread use of the Reader, her 




B. Why Not Fitness, Negligent Design/Manufacture, and Least-Cost 
Avoider? 
But what about the three product-risk norms discussed earlier—fitness, 
negligent design/manufacture, and least cost-avoider?  Why don’t they apply to 
software sales?  Let us examine the fitness norm first. 
How can vulnerability-ridden software be fit?  To see why it is fit, 
consider that fitness is determined, not by the opinion of software experts, but 
by contextually-sensitive judgments of software buyers.  Software sales violate 
the norm only if those judgments classify the software as unfit.  Software 
buyers share no such judgment.  They demand quick-to-market, cheap, 
vulnerability-ridden software.  One may rightly object that our buyers who 
correctly assess the risks of using vulnerability-ridden software may regard 
such software as unfit.  However, even if they do, their judgment is, so to 
speak, inert.  Buyers assessing risk correctly still think they ought conditionally 
to conform to the “demand vulnerability-ridden software” norm and hence 
conform to the norm.  That is the norm that governs, not the “negligent-design-
manufacture” norm—despite any judgment of unfitness that buyers who assess 
risk correctly may make. 
Essentially the same points hold for the “negligent design/manufacture” 
norm.  It may appear to apply because some vulnerabilities are clearly the 
result of negligent design.
93
  Software “buffer overflows” are a good example 
of this.  A buffer is a temporary location on a computer that a program uses to 
store information before it sends it to the CPU for processing.
94
  Programmers 
can take effective steps to ensure that, before storing information in a buffer, 
the program checks to see if the capacity of the buffer is large enough to 
contain the information.  To fail to do so is to create a buffer overflow 
vulnerability, which one can exploit to take over a computer and make it run 
 
 92. The third-party risks are, in the terminology of economics, externalities—effects of a decision on 
those who did not make the decision and whose interests were not taken into account in making the decision.  
See HARRISON, supra note 81, at 44–45. 
 93. We are not using “negligent” here in legal sense.  We simply have in mind the non-legal use to mean 
“without sufficient attention.”  We discuss negligence as a tort in Part VI. 
 94. See, e.g., Corey Pincock, Secure Windows Initiative Trial by Fire: IIS 5.0 Printer ISAPI Buffer 
Overflow, SANS INST. INFOSEC READING ROOM, http://www.sans.org/reading_room/whitepapers/win2k/ 
secure-windows-initiative-trial-fire-iis-50-printer-isapi-buffer-overflow_190 (last visited Jan. 24, 2012). 
72 JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & POLICY [Vol. 2012 
programs one has written.
95
  The consensus of software development experts is 
that, in a wide range of cases at least, it is negligent to create a buffer overflow 
vulnerability.
96
 As computer security writers note, “[T]he existence of a classic 
overflow strongly suggests that the programmer is not considering even the 
most basic of security protections.”
97
 
Agreement on such instances of negligence is not, however, sufficient to 
show that software sales violate the negligent design/manufacture norm.  The 
norm is that sellers do not offer products that, as a result of negligent design or 
manufacture, impose an unreasonable risk of loss on buyers using the product 
as intended.  Unreasonableness is determined by shared judgments that 
allocate risks of loss between sellers and buyers; thus, to claim that 
vulnerability ridden software imposes unreasonable risks is to claim the shared 
judgment does so.  Software buyers share no such judgment.  The argument is 
exactly parallel to the argument in the case of the “negligent 
design/manufacture” norm. Buyers prefer quick-to-market, cheap, 
vulnerability-ridden software.  Buyers who assess risk incorrectly regard the 
risks as unreasonable, but it does not matter whether they do or not.  They still 
think they ought conditionally to conform to the “vulnerability-ridden” norm. 
The case for thinking software sales violate the least-cost avoider norm 
may, at first sight, seem considerably stronger, for as we will argue shortly, 
software developers are the least-cost avoider for a wide range of losses arising 
from software vulnerabilities.  It does not follow, however, that sales of 
vulnerability-ridden software violate the least-cost avoider norm.  One applies 
the least-cost avoider norm in light of shared normative judgments that allocate 
the burden of avoiding the risk of loss.  Thus, to claim that vulnerability-ridden 
software violates the best loss avoider norm is to claim that shared judgments 
allocate burden on software developers in a significant range of cases.  As we 
argue below in Part IV.C, the opposite is true.  Buyers demand quick-to-
market, cheap, vulnerability-ridden software.  It does not matter whether 
buyers who assess risk incorrectly judge software developers to be the best 
loss-avoids in some cases; they conform to the “demand vulnerability-ridden 
software” norm anyway. 
Arguing that software sales do not violate the three product-risk norms 
given as examples does not show that sales do not violate other product-risk 
norms; however, the argument generalizes to other norms.  Consider any 
product-risk norm that purportedly assigns the risk of at least some 
vulnerability to software developers.  That claim will be inconsistent with the 
fact that buyers demand quick-to-market, cheap, vulnerability-ridden software. 
 
 95. See Aleph One, Smashing the Stack for Fun and Profit, PHRACK MAG., Aug. 11, 1996, available at  
http://www.phrack.com/issues.html?issue=49&id=14#article (noting that “over the last few months there has 
been a large increase of buffer overflow vulnerabilities being both discovered and exploited”). 
 96. See, e.g., Pincock, supra note 94 (noting that “[b]ecause buffer overflows begin with poor 
programming practices it is essential that vendors train their programmers to write secure code”). 
 97. CWE-120: Buffer Copy without Checking Size of Input (‘Classic Buffer Overflow’), COMMON 
WEAKNESS ENUMERATION, http://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/120.html (last updated Sep. 13, 2011). 
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C. The “Vulnerability-Ridden” Norm Is Not Value-Optimal 
A product-risk norm is value-optimal when and only when the tradeoffs it 
implements are as least as well justified as the tradeoffs implemented by an 
alternative norm.  The “vulnerability-ridden” norm is not value-optimal 
because there is a better justified alternative.  Under the current norm, buyers 
bear the risk of loss from unauthorized access resulting from vulnerabilities; 
the better justified option shifts a good part of that risk on to software 
developers. 
The existence of a consensus on this point may seem surprising.  It is 
difficult to obtain reliable data concerning losses, even in the case of readily 
quantifiable data such as the time, effort, and money involved in detecting 
unauthorized access, diagnosing its effects, removing malware that may have 
been installed, and lost productivity resulting from network malfunctions.  This 
difficulty does not, however, prevent widespread agreement that the cost of 
unauthorized access runs in the billions of dollars a year.
98
  While not all of 
these losses can be traced back to software vulnerabilities, vulnerabilities are 
nonetheless a significant factor,
99
 and the consensus is that the cost of 
improving software development procedures to an extent that would 
significantly reduce vulnerabilities would be considerably less than the 
aggregate cost of unauthorized access mediated by vulnerabilities.
100
  Software 
developers are—to a considerable extent—the least-cost avoider with regard to 
a wide range of vulnerabilities. 
This conclusion is reinforced by considering losses that resist 
quantification, primarily: invasion of privacy, loss of trust, and anxiety from a 
sense of increased risk.
101
  The assessment of a matter of making normative 
judgments about the desirability of competing policy goals—in particular, the 
goals served by keeping software costs down versus the value of trust, privacy, 
and a reduced sense of risk.  To the extent one thinks a reduction in non-
quantitative losses is worth an increase in software development costs, one has 
an additional reason to regard software developers as the least cost-avoiders 
over a wide range of cases. 
We conclude that the “vulnerability-ridden” norm is not value-optimal.  
The solution is to replace that norm with a value-optimal norm.  But what 
 
 98. See CATE, supra note 1, at 6–7. 
 99. See Schultz, supra note 1, at 1. 
 100. See GRAFF & VAN WYK, supra note 88, at 56; ROGER S. PRESSMAN, SOFTWARE ENGINEERING: A 
PRACTITIONER’S APPROACH 13–14 (2001); PONEMON INST., BUSINESS CASE FOR DATA PROTECTION: A STUDY 
OF CEOS AND OTHER C-LEVEL EXECUTIVES IN THE UNITED KINGDOM 2 (Mar. 2010),  
http://www.ponemon.org/local/upload/fckjail/generalcontent/18/file/IBM%20Business%20Case%20for%20D
ata%20Protection%20UK%20White%20Paper%20FINAL6%20doc.pdf (noting that “C-level executives 
believe the cost savings from investing in a data protection program of £11 million is substantially higher than 
the extrapolated value of data protection spending of £1.9 million. This suggests a very healthy ROI for data 
protection programs”).  The study is of course not a study of investment in software development, but the 
significant savings from protecting data on networks suggest that reasonable software development practices 
that reduced the incidence of vulnerabilities would save money. 
 101. See Alessandro Acquisti et al., Is There a Cost to Privacy Breaches? An Event Study, ICIS 2006 
PROCEEDINGS, 1563, 1564–65 (2006), http://aisel.aisnet.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1215&context= 
icis2006. 
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exactly should the alternative norm be?  The more software developers must 
invest to create norm-conforming software, the less is left over for other 
important goals, including promoting software innovation,
102
 promoting the 
development of open source software,
103
 and ensuring sufficient 
competitiveness among software sellers.
104
  The less developers invest, the 
greater the risk of loss from unauthorized access, and hence the greater the 
investment buyers must make in avoiding those losses or recovering from them 
when they occur.  The more buyers invest, the less they have for the wide 
variety of other goals they pursue.  A value-optimal norm must define a best 
justified tradeoff among the competing goals. 
V. BEST PRACTICES AND BEST-PRACTICES NORMS 
We claim that the norm should be that buyers demand software developed 
following best practices.  One immediate difficulty is that “[b]est practices has 
become an overused, underdeveloped catchphrase employed by industries and 
professions to signal an often unsubstantiated superiority in a given field.”
105
  
Accordingly, our first step is to explain what we mean by “best practices.”  We 
then argue for the “buyers demand best practices software” norm. 
A. Best Practices Defined 
A best practice in a particular industry is a practice (method, process, or 
system) meeting two conditions.  The first condition consists of two parts.  Part 
one: with regard to one or more goals, there must be widespread agreement 
that it is highly desirable that those goals be achieved.
106
  Call these goals the 
best practice goals. Part two: there must be widespread agreement that 
following the practice is a sufficiently reliable, sufficiently detailed means of 
meeting the best practice goals.
107
 
An example is helpful.  In the United Kingdom, the Electrical Safety 
Council promulgates best practices for electrical wiring.
108
  The Council offers 
“a series of Best Practice Guides in association with leading industry bodies 
 
 102. See MICHAEL A. CARRIER, INNOVATION FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: HARNESSING THE POWER OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ANTITRUST LAW 19–33 (2009) (emphasizing the importance of innovation). 
 103. On the importance of open source software, see Edward M. Corrado, The Importance of Open 
Access, Open Source, and Open Standards for Libraries, ISSUES IN SCI. & TECH. LIBRARIANSHIP, Spring 2005, 
available at http://www.istl.org/ 05-spring/article2.html.; David A. Wheeler, Why Open Source Software / 
Free Software (OSS/FS, FLOSS, or FOSS)? Look at the Numbers!, http://www.dwheeler.com/ 
oss_fs_why.html (last updated April 16, 2007) (offering statistics to show that open source software can be a 
better option than proprietary software).  Best practices appropriate for proprietary software might unduly 
constrain the development of open source software. 
 104. See generally CARRIER, supra note 102, at 304–12 (discussing competition in intellectual property). 
 105. Ira P. Robbins, Best Practices on “Best Practices”: Legal Education and Beyond, 16 CLINICAL L. 
REV. 269, 271 (2009). 
 106. Id. at 291 (explaining that the first requirement requires that “those who attempt to discover or 
define a best practice must agree on the goal that the practice is intended to achieve”). 
 107. Id. at 292 (discussing benchmarking as an objectively verifiable means of meeting best practice 
goals). 
 108. See generally Best Practice Guides. ELECTRICAL SAFETY COUNCIL (Jan. 24, 2012), 
http://www.esc.org.uk/industry/industry-guidance/best-practice-guides/. 
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for the benefit of electrical contractors and installers, and their customers.”
109
  
The best practice goal is adequate safety, a goal widely regarded as highly 
desirable;
110
 further, there is also widespread agreement that following the 
practices is a sufficiently reliable way to achieve that goal.  The practices 
contain specific, detailed requirements for testing and installation.  The best 
practices for electrical wiring, for example, require that the electrician 
determine whether the insulation resistance in electrical circuits is at least one 
megaohm; if not, equipment on that circuit must be disconnected, or 30 mA 
RCD protection must be installed.
111
  Even a cursory survey of best practices 
reveals that they typically provide quite detailed advice.  We defer our 
explanations of “sufficiently reliable,” and “sufficiently detailed” to the 
discussion of the second condition. 
To formulate the second condition, note that practices meeting the first 
condition implement tradeoffs between the best practice goal and a variety of 
other competing goals.
112
  The reason is that following best practices typically 
requires an increased investment of time, effort, and money.  Conforming to 
electrical wiring best practices, for example, requires various inspections and 
the installation of hardware upgrades.
113
  This increases the cost of maintaining 
buildings, and the increased cost entails tradeoffs between safety and other 
goals.  Increased wiring costs can, for example, affect the availability of low 
cost rentals. 
Best practices for pharmaceutical company staffing and expenditure are 
another example.  The tradeoff is between costs and discovering, developing, 
and distributing high-quality drugs at reasonable prices.  This fact forms a key 
selling point for Best Practices, a company that licenses access to a database of 
best practices: 
By finding the optimal level of staffing and spending to achieve 
efficiency and effectiveness, companies can save money while 
maintaining a high-value medical affairs function [discovering, 
developing, and distributing high-quality drugs at reasonable prices]. 
Medical affairs leaders can use the information in this . . . document to 
learn how top companies find the optimal level of staffing and 
spending to achieve both efficiency and effectiveness in executing the 
 
 109. See, e.g., ELECTRICAL SAFETY COUNCIL, SELECTION AND USE OF PLUG-IN SOCKET OUTLET TEST 
DEVICES 2 (Jan. 24, 2012), available at http://www.esc.org.uk/fileadmin/user_upload/documents/industry/ 
best_practice/BPG8_10.pdf. 
 110. See Statistics, ELECTRICAL SAFETY COUNCIL, http://www.esc.org.uk/stakeholder/policies-and-
research/statistics/ (last visited Jan. 17, 2012) (offering safety statistics). 
 111. 30 mA RCD protection (the British equivalent of CGFI switches) greatly reduces the risk of an 
electrical shock sufficient to cause arterial fibrillation, the main cause of death from electric shock.  See 
ELECTRICAL SECURITY COUNCIL, BEST PRACTICE GUIDE 6 (2d ed. 2010), available at http://www.esc.org.uk/ 
pdfs/business-and-community/electrical-industry/BPG1v2_web.pdf. 
 112. See, ELECTRICAL SAFETY COUNCIL, REPLACING A CONSUMER UNIT IN DOMESTIC PREMISES WHERE 
LIGHT CIRCUITS HAVE NO PROTECTIVE CONDUCTOR 5 (Mar. 2010), available at http:// www.esc.org.uk/ 
fileadmin/user_upload/documents/industry/ best_practice/BPG1v2_web.pdf (advising that “where the 
customer is . . . not prepared to accept the cost or disruption of re-wiring . . . but still needs a new consumer 
unit [circuit breaker box], . . . the installer needs to carry out a risk assessment before agreeing to replace only 
the consumer unit”). 
 113. See id. at 6 (discussing the need for risk inspection and testing). 
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mission of medical affairs.
114
 
To trade costs against healthcare is, of course, to trade costs against the 
vast number of concerns and goals affected by the quality and availability of 
health care.  A large number of similar examples can be found in the Best 
Practices Database in Improving the Living Environment.
115
  The database 
provides access to “the practical ways in which public, private and civil society 
sectors are working together to improve governance, eradicate poverty, provide 




Now we can state the second condition: the tradeoffs implemented by 
following the practices are at least as well justified as any alternative.
117
  This 
is what makes the practices best practices.  One cannot improve the tradeoffs 
by switching to alternative practices.  Discussions of best practices do not 
explicitly offer this “at least as well justified” gloss on what makes best 
practices best.
118
  In its discussion of pharmaceutical best practices the 
company Best Practices characterizes best practices as “optimal”; such 
practices yield “the optimal level of staffing and spending.”
119
  Another 
common characterization is “best in class”—a company adopts best practices 
by “measuring . . . functions, processes, activities, products, or services against 
those of [its] competitors and improving . . . [to match] the best-in-
class . . . .”
120
  To be optimal or best-in-class is, however, surely to be at least 
as well justified as any alternative.  Whatever the language used, we take it to 
be clear that a best practice is one that is at least as well justified as any 
alternative; if there is a better justified alternative, the practice can hardly be 
best. 
The “at least as well justified” requirement explains why we do not 
require best practices to be the most reliable way to achieve the consensus 
goals.
121
  The best justified tradeoffs may sacrifice some reliability in the name 
of furthering other goals.  The requirement also explains why—and in what 
sense—best practices are sufficiently detailed methods.  Recall the Electrical 
Safety Council requirement that 30 mA RCD protection must be installed in 
 
 114. Medical Affairs Staffing & Spend: Maximizing Value, Decreasing Cost, BEST PRACTICES, LLC, 
http://www.best-in-class.com/bestp/domrep.nsf/products/medical-affairs-staffing-spend-maximizing-value-
decreasing-cost (last visited Feb. 3, 2012). 
 115. BEST PRACTICES DATABASE IN IMPROVING THE LIVING ENVIRONMENT, http://www.bestpractices.org 
(last visited Feb. 3, 2012). 
 116. Id. 
 117. Cf. Robbins, supra note 105, at 291 (noting that to be a best practice, there can be only one way to 
accomplish the best practice goal). 
 118. See supra Part II.E (discussing value-optimal norms). 
 119. Medical Affairs Staffing & Spend, supra note 114. 
 120. ROBERT J. BOXWELL JR., BENCHMARKING FOR COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE 30 (1994).  The quote 
characterizes “benchmarking”; benchmarking is setting standards as a step toward adopting practices that 
realize them.  Id. at 17.  The practices are “best practices” if they are “best in class.”  “State of the art” is a 
similar characterization; as Robbins notes, Great Britain also uses the term best practices in the area of public 
management, defining a best practice as generally accepted “state of the art” approach.  Robbins supra note 
105, at 281 (citing Tessa Brannan et al., Assisting Best Practice as a Means of Innovation, 4 LOC. GOV’T 
STUD. 23, 24 (2008)). 
 121. See supra Part II.E. (discussing value-optimal norms). 
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electrical circuits with less than one megohm of resistance.
122
 This requirement 
allows one to compare Electrical Safety Council practices to practices that 
require different combinations of cost and protection against electrical shock.  
In general, where one has a variety of competing goals, one will want to 
compare various tradeoffs among those goals to determine which tradeoffs are 
the best justified.  Best practices must be sufficiently detailed to allow one to 
make those comparisons. 
B. Summary of the Argument for the Best-practices Norm 
We begin with a summary of the argument.  (1) Best practices for 
software development exist, and software developers would significantly 
reduce vulnerabilities if they followed them.  (2) Best practices make tradeoffs 
among competing goals, where the tradeoffs are at least as well justified as the 
tradeoffs implemented by alternative practices.  Therefore (3), a “buyers 
demand best practices software” norm would be a value-optimal norm whose 
implementation would significantly reduce vulnerabilities. 
Premise (2) follows from our discussion of best practices.  As that 
discussion shows, best practices for software development—assuming they 
exist—make tradeoffs among relevant competing goals that are at least as well 
justified as alternatives.  Relevant goals include, as we noted earlier, prompting 
innovation, promoting the development of open source software, and ensuring 
sufficient competitiveness.
123
  Given (2), the conclusion in (3) follows since a 
product-risk norm is value-optimal provided the tradeoffs it implements are at 
least as well justified as any alternative tradeoffs.  The only question then is 
whether best practices exist for software development.  One could reasonably 
think that they do not.  It is, after all, routine to observe, as leading security 
expert Eugene Spafford does, that software “is usually produced using error-
prone tools and methods, including inadequate testing.”
124
  Such practices can 
hardly qualify as best.  Our view is that this does not show that best practices 
do not exist; it merely shows that existing best practices are not followed. 
C. Best Practices for Software Development 
We begin with a specific example.  It is a best practice to ensure that, 
before a program stores information in a buffer, it first checks to see if the 
amount of information is greater than the capacity of the buffer.
125
  Failing to 
do so creates a buffer overflow vulnerability.
126
  The practice meets the two 
requirements for being a best practice.
127
  The first requirement is that there 
 
 122. BEST PRACTICE GUIDE, supra note 102, at 6. 
 123. See supra notes 102–04 and accompanying text. 
 124. Spafford, supra note 9, at 36. 
 125. See CAPERS JONES, SOFTWARE ENGINEERING BEST PRACTICES: LESSONS FROM SUCCESSFUL 
PROJECTS IN THE TOP COMPANIES 531 (2010) (explaining that the use of debugging tools to check for buffer 
overflow problems “are so common that usage is a standard practice and therefore would be classed as a best 
practice”). 
 126. See id. at 514 (noting that “buffer overflows are common examples of vulnerabilities”). 
 127. See Robbins, supra note 105, at 291–92 (explaining the requirements for best practices). 
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must be widespread agreement that it is highly desirable to realize a certain 
goal, and there must be widespread agreement that following the practice is a 
sufficiently reliable and sufficiently detailed means of meeting that goal.
128
  As 
we noted earlier, there is consensus on the goal of reducing vulnerabilities by 
requiring a greater investment in software development.
129
  The consensus is, 
first, that an increased investment in software development would reduce the 
number of vulnerabilities in software over a significant range of cases, and 
hence the losses from unauthorized access.
130
 There is also widespread 
agreement that the practice—ensuring that the amount of information to be 




The second requirement is that the tradeoffs which the practice 
implements must be at least as well justified as any alternative.
132
  It seems to 
be true, as the consensus is that the time, effort, and money needed to ensure 
the amount of information to be stored does not exceed the capacity of the 
buffer is far less than the losses thereby avoided.
133
  There are many such 
examples. A vulnerability is just a particular type of defect, similar in principle 
to any other software defect, such as giving the wrong answer or crashing. The 
same high-level picture holds for both software defects in general and software 
vulnerabilities in particular: the amount depends very much on the design and 
programming practices used.
134
  There is widespread agreement that one 
should ensure adequate overall management of the creation of the software, 
from first deciding what the behavior of the software should be, and then 
through designing it, writing it, and especially testing it.
135
  There is also 
widespread agreement on how to write and design the actual computer 
programs (“code” in the language of programmers) that collectively are the 
software.
136
 This includes, for example, such matters as the choice of 
appropriate data structures and algorithms, structuring the flow of control well, 
obeying abstraction barriers, and breaking the overall software into appropriate 
size pieces.
137
  The techniques for developing sufficiently defect-free software 
are collectively known as software engineering.
138
  How to write individual 
 
 128. See id. at 278. 
 129. See supra Part IV.C. 
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 138. See id. at 1 (“Software engineering is the part of systems engineering that deals with the systematic 
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computer programs well, and the basics of software engineering are fairly 
well-settled subjects,
139
 and should be known by competent software 
developers. For example, one can find many aphorisms summarizing these 
principals in a handbook of software engineering.
140
  More importantly, the 
basics of how to construct good quality code and the basics of software 
engineering formed a significant fraction of the core (required) portion of the 
model computer science bachelor’s degree curriculum jointly published by the 
two main professional societies for computer science in 2001.
141
 Furthermore, 
most of that same material was also found in the earlier 1978 and 1991 
versions of that model undergraduate curriculum, though of course some 
important details have changed as the field has evolved. Writing secure 
software also requires some additional knowledge.  Some minimal training in 
writing secure software is a standard part of today’s undergraduate curriculum 
for computer science majors,
142
 but was not so common a decade ago.  In 
general, a great deal is known about what sort of software development 
practices lead to fewer software defects, and what sort lead to more defects.  
One particular area of software engineering that has seen real progress in the 
past 20 years or so is testing.
143
  There are a whole host of automated 
techniques for testing whether software under development contains errors, 
and use of these techniques significantly lower the defect rate in the final 
product.  Failure to use any of these newer testing techniques leads to higher 
defect rates.  It is common wisdom among experts in software development 
that all the proper attention to all the issues we have mentioned lead to lower 
defect rates, and various studies from over the years back up this common 
 
development, evaluation, and maintenance of software.”). 
 139. However, the choice of which software engineering methodology is the best one for managing 
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2009); IAN SOMMERVILLE, SOFTWARE ENGINEERING (9th ed. 2010). 
 143. See ANDERSON, supra note 4, at 829. 




In sum, there are software development practices that meet the conditions 
for being best practices.
145
  First, there is a goal—reducing the number of 
vulnerabilities—and there is widespread agreement that the goal is desirable, 
and that following the practices is a sufficiently detailed, reliable way to 
achieve that goal.  Second, there is widespread agreement, at least to some 
extent, that the tradeoffs implemented by following the practices are at least as 
well-justified than any alternative.  The “at least to some extent” qualification 
acknowledges that there is some indeterminacy here.  It is clear that the 
tradeoffs involved in following certain best practices—such as checking on 
adequate buffer size—are at least as well justified as any alternative, and it is 
clear in general that one or more combinations of the practices discussed above 
implement tradeoffs that are at least as well justified as any alternative.  But it 
is not clear what those combinations are.  Exactly what tradeoffs among the 
various competing goals are best justified is unclear; there are competing 
arguments for weighing various goals in various ways.
146
 
In evaluating such tradeoffs, it is important to bear in mind an often 
overlooked limit on what best practices can achieve.  Software is different 
from other engineered products in that sufficiently complex software inevitably 
has programming flaws.
147
  In contrast, design flaws are not inevitable in, for 
example, refrigerators, batteries, and bridges even when they exhibit 
considerable complexity.  Software alone combines complexity and inevitable 
flaws.  Thus, no matter how much one invests in development procedures 
designed to reduce programming flaws, flaws—and perhaps vulnerabilities—
will remain.  There are two reasons for this. 
First, most of engineering is governed by continuous mathematics, 
whereas software is governed by discrete mathematics.
148
 Continuous 
mathematics includes the mathematics of the real numbers, which describe the 
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physics of motion and electricity.
149
 Discrete mathematics includes the 
mathematics of the integers and of strings of letters.
150
  For our purposes, the 
heart of continuous mathematics is the notion of a continuous function.  The 
definition of continuous function is typically given in calculus classes using 
Greek lambdas and epsilons, but what a continuous function means to an 
engineer is that if, in a continuous system, you make a very small error in one 
of your inputs, the error in the behavior of your system must also be small.  
The discrete mathematics that governs software offers no such guarantees.  An 
error in a single line of a million-line program can cause arbitrarily large 
errors.  The second thing that makes software different from other engineered 
entities is that there is no way to “over engineer” for safety in designing 
software, as one can in designing many physical systems.
151
  For example, if 
one wants to design a building to withstand 140 mile per hour winds, one can 
do the calculations about the necessary material strength, thickness, etc., to 
withstand 150 mile per hour winds, and then build according to those 
calculations to create an extra margin for safety. There are analogous things to 
do in many engineering situations, but not in the construction of software. 
D. Developers Do Not Follow Best Practices 
Software developers do not follow the best practices.  As we noted 
earlier, software “is usually produced using error-prone tools and methods, 
including inadequate testing.”
152
  Creating buffer overflow vulnerabilities is a 
clear violation of best practices, but the vulnerability is still a common 
occurrence
153
 and still ranks third on the SANS Institute’s 2011 list of the top 
twenty-five most dangerous software errors.
154
  Why don’t software developers 
conform more closely to best practices?  The answer lies in the behavior of 
buyers.  Buyers are trapped in a self-perpetuating coordination norm under 
which they demand vulnerability-ridden software.  In such a case, the profit-
maximizing strategy for software developers is to be the first in the market to 
offer a particular type of software or an upgrade to existing software.  
Reducing vulnerabilities by following best practices requires a longer and 
more costly development process, so software developers avoid those 
practices. 
VI. CONDITIONS FOR CREATING THE NORM 
The solution is to create a value-optimal, best-practices norm governing 
software sales in a market which sufficiently approximates perfect norm-
 
 149. See J. D. JOSHI, FOUNDATIONS OF DISCRETE MATHEMATICS 1–3 (1989) (explaining the differences 
between continuous and discrete mathematics). 
 150. Roberts, supra note 148, at 1594. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Spafford, supra note 9, at 36. 
 153. Jason Lam, Top 25 Series – Rank 3 – Classic Buffer Overflow, APPSEC BLOG (Jan. 24, 2012, 7:42 
PM), http://software-security.sans.org/blog/2010/03/02/top-25-series-rank-3-classic-buffer-overflow# 
comments. 
 154. Id. 
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competitiveness. The closer the market approximates perfect norm-
competitiveness, the more rational, profit-motive driven sellers conform to the 
norm.  The existence of the value-optimal norm ensures the norm-governed 
sales implement acceptable tradeoffs, tradeoffs to which buyers give free and 
informed consent.  We remark in passing that the norm would do more than 
just reduce the number of vulnerabilities; it would reduce the number of 
software defects generally.  As we noted earlier, a vulnerability is a type of 
software defect, and following best practices reduces defects generally.
155
  
How can one best ensure that a value-optimal norm operates in a sufficiently 
norm-competitive market?  We first consider ensuring a sufficiently norm-
competitive market and then turn to creating the norm. 
A perfectly norm-competitive market exists when and only when two 
requirements are fulfilled: perfect competition and sufficient detection.  
Current markets fall far short of both requirements. 
A. Perfect Competition 
The operating system market falls far short of the requirement of multiple 
sellers.  Microsoft dominates, with a relatively small market share going to 
Apple and Linux (and in the future, Google’s Chrome operating system could 
possibly acquire a share of the market as well).
156
  There are also significant 
barriers to entry, as operating systems are very costly to develop and whether 
they will be adopted is uncertain.
157
 In addition, operating systems are not 
sufficiently homogeneous; switching from one to the other involves significant 
costs.
158
  These issues require detailed analysis in the context of antitrust and 
intellectual property law,
159
 and that task lies outside the scope of our efforts 
here.  In contrast to the operating system market, markets for software 
applications and utilities may sufficiently approximate perfect competition, but 
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Id. 
 158. See SHAPIRO & VARIAN, supra note 7, at 103–72 (claiming switching costs lead to customer lock-
in). 
 159. See generally CARRIER, supra note 102, at 5–10 (detailing various legal impediments to innovation); 
William H. Page and & Seldon J. Childers, Software Development as an Antitrust Remedy: Lessons from the 
Enforcement of the Microsoft Communications Protocol Licensing Requirement, 14 MICH. TELECOMM. & 
TECH. L. REV. 77, 79 (2007). 
No. 1] VULNERABLE SOFTWARE 83 
as with operating system markets, we will put the question aside.  For our 
purposes, we may assume perfect competition. 
B. Sufficient Detection 
Sufficient detection is the requirement that there are enough norm-
violation-detecting buyers that a seller’s gain from norm-inconsistent behavior 
is smaller than the loss that results when norm-violation-detectors buy from 
norm-consistent sellers.  It may appear that this condition is not fulfilled.  
Typical consumers lack the expertise required to distinguish—by inspecting 
the software—between vulnerability-ridden software and software with 
significantly fewer vulnerabilities.
160
  This is worrisome, as it potentially leads 
to a lemons market.  We first explain the notion of a lemons market, and then 
consider whether a lemons market does in fact exist in regard to software 
vulnerabilities. 
We explain a lemons market using a version of the “used car” example 
first employed by the economist George Akerlof in his seminal article, The 
Market for Lemons.
161
  Suppose a town has 300 used cars for sale: 100 good 
ones worth $2,000, 100 so-so ones worth $1,500, and 100 lemons worth 
$1,000.  Buyers cannot tell the difference between a good and bad car; thus, 
buying a used car means entering a lottery in which the buyer has a 1/3 chance 
of getting a good car, a 1/3 chance of getting a so-so car, and a 1/3 chance of 
getting a lemon.
162
  The expected value of the purchase is $1,500.  Rational 
buyers, thus, will pay only $1,500 for a used car; consequently, buyers who 
value their good cars at over $1,500 do not offer those cars for sale.  Thus, the 
market now contains lemons worth $1,000 and not-so-good cars worth $1,500; 
the expected value of a used car drops to $1,250; consequently, buyers who 
value their cars above $1,250 do not offer them for sale.  The process 
continues until only the lemons are left on the market.
163
  In general, a lemons 
market exists when four conditions are fulfilled: (1) the products on the market 
vary significantly in the extent to which they have certain properties (the 
properties that make a car a lemon, for example), and buyers regard products 
with the properties in question as having less expected value than those 
without them;
 164
 (2) there is an asymmetry of information where buyers cannot 
discriminate between products with the properties and those without, but 
sellers can at least partially distinguish them; and furthermore, (3) there is no 
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Q. J. ECON. 488, 489−92 (1970). 
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 163. See id. (stating that the “bad cars” will drive the good ones off the market). 
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reliable signal of quality (i.e., sellers with an excellent car have no way to 
reliably disclose this fact to buyers); however, (4) buyers know there is a mix 
of products on the market. 
Are these four conditions fulfilled for software vulnerabilities?  In 
answering this question, it is important to distinguish two markets: the market 
for security software and systems, such as firewalls, anti-virus software, or 
secure USB memory sticks, and the market for other sorts of mass-consumer 
software.  Bruce Schneier has argued convincingly the former market is a 
lemons market.
165
  Others have picked up on his claim and argued that it may 
also apply to software that is (relatively) secure—that is, software that is 
relatively free of vulnerabilities.
166
  We are not so sure.  While there are strong 
arguments that security software is a lemons market, it is unclear whether 
secure software is a lemons market.  Conditions (2) and (4) are arguably 
fulfilled, but (1) and (3) are problematic.  We first briefly review the arguments 
in favor of regarding (2) and (4) as fulfilled.  Condition (2): Typical consumers 
do not have the expertise to distinguish by inspecting the software between 
secure and insecure software,
167
 while the developers do know something 
about what production practices they are using. Condition (4): Buyers—or at 
least a significant portion of buyers—do know that the market contains both 
vulnerability-ridden and not so vulnerability-ridden software.
168
 
Condition (1) requires (in part) that buyers regard vulnerability-ridden 
software as having less perceived expected value than similar software with 
significantly fewer vulnerabilities.  At the moment, this is not true.  Buyers are, 
on the whole, not willing to pay more for more secure software.
169
  Our 
proposal in Part VII is designed to change this, but if all it does is change 
consumer preferences, it may simply contribute to the creation of a lemons 
market in software.  Accordingly, our proposal will also suggest a mechanism 
for avoiding a lemons market. 
Condition (3) requires that there do not exist any reliable signals that 
differentiate vulnerability-ridden from similar software with significantly 
fewer vulnerabilities. Typical consumers do not have the expertise to 
distinguish by inspecting the software between vulnerability-ridden software 
and software with significantly fewer vulnerabilities.  Inspection is not, 
however, the only way to determine the extent to which software suffers from 
vulnerabilities.  The general quality of the software is a moderately reliable 
 
 165. See Schneier, supra note 160. 
 166. See, e.g., Barnes, supra note 88, at 292 (noting that “[a]s long as software is maintained as a trade 
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signal of the extent to which it contains vulnerabilities.  Vulnerabilities are a 
kind of flaw or defect in the software, and it is reasonable to assume that their 
occurrence correlates with the occurrence of other flaws, such as a tendency to 
crash or give wrong answers.
170
  Indeed, it is routine not to distinguish sharply 
between defects and vulnerabilities.  As security experts observe in a recent 
book, “Software defects are the single most critical weakness in computer 
systems. . . . [S]oftware defects lead directly to software exploit[ation].”
171
  
The correlation between vulnerabilities and defects is sufficiently strong that at 
least some buyers will infer that improperly functioning software is likely to 
contain significant vulnerabilities.
172
  This signaling mechanism is far from 
perfect, but sufficient detection does not require that all or most buyers detect 
vulnerability-ridden software, just that enough do to impose losses on sellers 
who offer such software.  Thus, there is very possibly a signaling mechanism 
that is strong enough to prevent a lemons market. 
Our ultimate proposal in Part VII for changing the market to encourage 
the creation of secure software does not rely solely on this possible signaling 
mechanism to avoid a potential lemons market.  We argue that the statute we 
propose, if adequately enforced, will ensure that condition (1) fails to hold.  
That condition requires that software products vary significantly in the extent 
to which they have vulnerabilities, and that buyers regard vulnerability-ridden 
software as having less perceived expected value than similar software with 
significantly fewer vulnerabilities.  We explain and give a motive for the “vary 
significantly” provision, and we argue that it will not be fulfilled.  Thus, our 
proposal avoids the problem of a lemons market. 
While showing how to avoid a lemons market is important, it is not the 
main thrust of our statutory proposal.  Our central claim is that the statute, if 
adequately enforced, will give rise to a best-practices norm.  We argue in Part 
VII that, once the norm is in place, the sufficient detection assumption will be 
more or less true.  There will be, in enough different situations, enough norm-
violation-detecting buyers that norm-inconsistent sellers suffer losses. 
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C. Creating the Norm 
Creating the norm requires ensuring that the conditions for the existence 
of a coordination norm are fulfilled.  (1) The relevant regularity must obtain: 
buyers must regularly demand best practices software; and (2) the regularity 
must exist at least in part because buyers think they ought to conform as long 
as everyone else does.
173
  Assume, for the moment, a perfectly norm-
competitive market. Then, it is in principle clear how to ensure these 
conditions are fulfilled: convince almost all buyers to demand best practices 
software—where they demand this, at least in part, because they think they 
ought to as long as everyone else does.  Assuming the demand persists long 
enough, profit-motive driven software developers will—in a perfectly 
competitive market—begin to meet the demand.  When they do, buyers will 
continue to demand, and the following regularity will be established: buyers 
demand best practices software.  The regularity will exist in part because 
buyers think that they ought to conform as long as everyone else does.  The 
conviction that they ought to conform will be reinforced by the fact that 
unilateral non-conformity will mean going without software the buyer wants. 
The assumption of a perfectly competitive market is essential.  It ensures 
that developers will respond to the buyer demand; without such a response the 
demand will almost certainly fade away.  Buyers of Netbook computers could 
demand Netbooks with a processor equivalent in power to the Pentium 4 
processor, but sellers will not meet the demand a processor that powerful—it 
currently generates too much heat to function in a Netbook.  Netbook buyers 
will either cease to demand such a processor, or they will cease to purchase 
Netbooks.  The latter option is unlikely in the case of software generally, so an 
unmet buyer demand will eventually simply fade away. 
D. The Approximation Goals 
To summarize, there are three goals: (1) convince buyers that they ought 
conditionally to demand best practices software and ensure that they do indeed 
demand it for that reason; (2) avoid the creation of a lemons market; and (3) 
once the norm exits, ensure that, in enough different situations, there will be 
enough norm-violation-detecting buyers that norm-inconsistent sellers suffer 
losses.  Call these the approximation goals. Market forces will not achieve the 
approximation goals.
174
 Buyers are trapped in the self-perpetuating 
“vulnerability-ridden” coordination norm; moreover, the persistence of the 
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No. 1] VULNERABLE SOFTWARE 87 
norm ensures that the profit–maximizing strategy is to be the first in the market 
to offer a particular type of software or an upgrade to existing software, even if 
the software or upgrade is imperfect in a variety of ways, including having 
vulnerabilities.  As long as buyers are trapped in the norm, they will not 
demand best practices software.  Even those who understand the individual and 
social advantages of such software are unlikely to do so; a unilateral demand 
for best practices software simply falls on deaf ears.  We conclude that legal 
regulation is required to achieve the two approximation goals.
175
  The question, 
then, is what sort of legal regulation will best achieve the approximation goals. 
VII. CREATING THE NORM THROUGH LEGAL REGULATION 
We first consider common law negligence and products liability for 
defective design, as well as statutory proposals modeled more or less along the 
lines of those two common law doctrines.
176
  We argue that these approaches 
clearly fail to achieve the approximation goals.  We offer a statutory alternative 
built around the idea of best practices. 
A. Negligence 
A software developer is liable in negligence for losses resulting from 
vulnerability only if the vulnerability was the result of the software developer’s 
failure to act as a reasonable developer would.
177
  There are a number of 
difficulties in using negligence to regulate vulnerabilities in software;
178
 we 
focus entirely on assessing how well it will achieve the approximation goals. 
It is certainly possible that negligence cases could lead to the fulfillment 
of the approximation goals.  Here is one possible scenario.  Successful 
negligence claims against software developers yield a series of decisions that, 
other things being equal, it is negligent not to follow this or that best practice 
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(e. g., it is negligent to create a buffer overflow vulnerability).
179
  The “other 
things being equal” rider acknowledges that a developer who can demonstrate 
the reasonableness of a departure from best practices will not be liable.  On the 
basis of the series of decisions, courts and software developers both conclude 
that, other things being equal, it is negligent not to follow best practices for 
software development.
180
  Publicity about the law suits, combined perhaps with 
advertising from best practice complaint developers, convinces almost all 
buyers that they ought to demand best practices software, and they begin to 
demand it for that reason.  All software developers respond by following the 
practices.  This eliminates worries about fulfilling the sufficient detection 
condition.  Since all software is best-practices software, there is no need to 
detect software that is not.  Thus the following regularity arises: buyers 
demand best practices software.  Once the regularity is in place, unilateral non-
conformity will mean going without software the buyer wants, and buyers will 
think that they ought to conform as long as everyone else does. 
Each step in this scenario is problematic.  It is hardly automatic that the 
successful completion of the first step (namely, successful negligence claims 
against developers) would result in developers actually following best 
practices.  Developers would have to be convinced that the cost of doing so 
was less than the expected legal liability.
181
  Even in that case, it is hardly 
plausible that all developers will follow best practices; irrational developers 
will not do so.  Further, it is far from obvious that publicity and advertising 
would convince almost all buyers that they ought to demand best practice 
software and lead them to demand it on that basis.  Our focus, however, is on 
the first step—the assumption that courts will hold generally that it is negligent 
not to follow best practices.  This is unlikely to happen; hence, it is unlikely 
that the process will even get started. 
The role of custom in establishing reasonableness makes it extremely 
unlikely that courts will do so.  As the Restatement notes, “In determining 
whether conduct is negligent, the customs of the community, or others under 
like circumstances, are factors to be taken into account, but are not controlling 
where a reasonable man would not follow them.”
182
  The relevant customs for 
software development are not the best practices but the prevailing industry 
practices.
183
  In theory, industry practices are just “factors to be taken into 
account, but are not controlling where a reasonable man would not follow 
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them.”
184
  In practice, however, it is difficult for a plaintiff to overcome the 
defendant’s claim that it followed industry practice and hence proceeded 
reasonably.
185
  This is not a defect in tort law; it is a sensible approach to 
assessing reasonable design choices for one who is in the business of designing 
products to sell for a profit.  What practices should a software developer adopt 
when designing software for sale in the current market?  Buyers demand 
vulnerability-ridden software and will generally not pay a premium for more 
secure software.  The developer’s competitors cater to this demand by offering 
relatively inexpensive, insecure software.  A developer who invests too much 
in software development runs the risk of business losses.  Software developers, 
just as much as buyers, are in the grip of the “vulnerability-ridden” norm.  In a 
wide range of cases, developers will be able to make a convincing case that 
they acted reasonably. 
The case may not always be successful, of course.  Courts have rejected 
such reasonableness claims where the plaintiff has identified a readily 
available way to avoid the damage that the industry practices ignore.  A classic 
case is The T. J. Hooper.
186
  Two tugs, the Montrose and the T. J.Hooper, 
encountered a gale while towing barges.
187
  The tugs and the barges sank.
188
  
The cargo owners sued the barge owners, who in turned sued the owner of the 
two tugs; the owner petitioned to limit his liability.
189
  The court found that the 
tugs negligently unseaworthy because they lacked shortwave radios.
190
  Had 
they been so equipped, they would have received reports of worsening 
weather; had they received the reports, they would have avoided the storm by 
putting in at the Delaware breakwater.
191
  The case illustrates a familiar pattern 
in torts cases: (1) an activity imposes a significant risk of harm on third-parties, 
where (2) those engaging in and benefiting from the activity under invest in 
protecting the third parties; (3) the law responds by imposing on those 
engaging in the activity a duty to take reasonable steps to prevent harm to 
third-parties, where (4) other things being equal, a reasonable step is one that 
reduces expected damage to third-parties by an amount greater than the total 
cost of the step.  Current software development practices certainly appear to fit 
this pattern.  Software developers underinvest in software development by 
ignoring best practices, thereby producing vulnerability-ridden software that 
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imposes, in the aggregate, significant losses on buyers and society as a whole.  
Should tort law hold that not following best practices is negligent?  It is 
unlikely that the courts will do so.  There are two key differences between 
shortwave radios of the T. J. Hooper and software best practices. 
The first is that the cost of shortwave radios was relatively small.
192
  The 
cost of acquiring a radio did not put a barge owner at a competitive 
disadvantage; indeed, it arguably conferred one since the owner could offer 
lower risk transport at the same cost as competitors.  This is a critical factor in 
making it unreasonable not to acquire a radio—even in the market context at 
the time.  The second difference is that barge owners could easily make a 
rough and ready comparison between the cost of the radio and the expected 
losses avoided by its use.
193
  The losses, when they do occur, can be huge; and, 
while the occurrence of violent storms is difficult to predict, their occurrence 
from time to time is certain.  This is a key factor in justifying the holding of 
negligence.  If the comparison was uncertain and controversial, it would be far 
less clear that owners acted unreasonably. In the case of software, the 
comparison is uncertain and controversial.  As we noted earlier, it is clear that 
some combination of best practices implement best-justified tradeoffs among 
the relevant goals, but it is unclear and controversial what combinations those 
are.  For both of these reasons, it is unlikely that the courts will hold that it is 
negligent not to follow best practices.
194
 
B. Products Liability for Defective Design 
A product is defective in design only when use of the product involves a 
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cost and is reasonably reliable if kept up; obviously it is a source of great protection to their tows.”  Id. 
 193. See id. (implying the benefits clearly outweigh the small costs). 
 194. This may strike some as dubious, because as Thomas Smedinghoff notes, “[r]ecent case law . . . 
recognizes that there may be a common law duty to provide security, the breach of which constitutes a tort.”  
Thomas J. Smedinghoff, Defining the Legal Standard for Information Security: What Does “Reasonable” 
Security Really Mean?, in SECURING PRIVACY IN THE INTERNET AGE, supra note 8, at 22.  In support, 
Smedinghoff cites Wolfe v.  MBNA Am. Bank, 485 F. Supp. 2d 874, 882 (W.D.Tenn. 2007), Guin v. Brazos 
Higher Educ. Serv. Corp., No. 05-668, 2006 WL 288483, at *4 (D. Minn. Feb. 7, 2006), and Bell v. Michigan 
Council 25 of the Am. Fed’n of State, County, and Municipal Emps., AFL-CIO, Local 1023, No. 246684, 
2005 WL 356306, at *5 (Mich. Ct. App. Feb. 15, 2005).  These cases certainly support Smedinghoff’s cautious 
claim that recent cases recognize that there may be a common law duty to provide security, but no case 
suggests that it is negligent not to follow best practices.  Guin holds that a laptop theft from a home was not 
foreseeable because the person in possession of it lived in a relatively safe neighborhood, had taken reasonable 
steps to prevent burglary.  Guin, No. 05-668, 2006 WL 288483, at *4.  Wolfe concerns the failure to verify the 
authenticity information in a credit card application taken by a telemarketer.  Wolfe, 485 F. Supp. 2d at 879.  
Bell concerns the non-online theft of information from a labor union; the court held that “defendant did owe 
plaintiffs a duty to protect them from identity theft by providing some safeguards to ensure the security of their 
most essential confidential identifying information.” Bell, No. 246684, 2005 WL 356306, at *5.  Other recent 
cases demonstrate that the courts may be reluctant to expand negligence doctrine to create liability for 
contributing to unauthorized access. In Forbes v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 420 F. Supp. 2d 1018, 1021 (D. 
Minn. 2006), the court rejects negligence liability for a bank’s role in permitting unauthorized access to 
information that could be used to commit identity theft; the court notes that the plaintiff did not allege any 
harm, just an increased risk of harm.  Id.  Standard tort law does not allow recovery for a merely increased risk 
of harm.  Banknorth, N.A. v. BJ’s Wholesale Club, Inc., 442 F. Supp. 2d 206, 216 (M.D. Pa. 2006), holds that 
even where there is a present injury to the plaintiff, the economic harm rule prevents recovery when the injury 
is merely economic.  Id. 
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foreseeable and unreasonable risk of harm.
195
  As with negligence, the role of 
custom in establishing reasonableness makes it unlikely that courts will hold 
that failing to follow best practices (or a defensible alternative to best 
practices) creates a foreseeable and unreasonable risk of harm.
196
  Evidence of 
industry practices is relevant under both of the main tests used to determine 
defectiveness—the “risk-utility” test (a product is defective when its risk of 
harm exceeds its benefits), and the “consumer expectations” test (a product is 
defective when it fails to meet the reasonable expectations of consumers).
197
  
Defendants may seek to show that a product was not defective by introducing 
evidence that other sellers customarily use the same design.
198
  For the same 
reasons given in the discussion of negligence, it is unlikely that the courts will 
hold that it is negligent not to follow best practices. 
C. Statutes Closely Modeled on Negligence or Products Liability 
The arguments above also apply to any statute modeled sufficiently 
closely on the common law requirements for negligence or products liability; 
indeed, the critique applies to any statute that incorporates a “reasonableness” 
requirement for software development where the courts will rely heavily on 
custom in interpreting that requirement.
199
  We suggest a different statutory 
alternative, modeled on best practices, as the best way to promote the 
approximation goals.  Our goal is not to define the statute itself but to define 
the task of creating it.  Our brief discussion is a catalog of problems to be 
solved, not a list of solutions. 
D. A Statutory Task 
The statute would identify best practices and require that software 
developers either follow them, or to avoid liability, be able to demonstrate the 
reasonableness of their alternative practices.  It is essential to implement this 
requirement in a way that allows developers reasonable flexibility in their 
choice of development methodologies; otherwise, the statute will excessively 
inhibit innovation. The statute could also delegate to a standard setting 
organization, like the Computer Security Division of the National Standards 
Institute (NIST)
200




 195. See Wright, supra note 59, at 1078. 
 196. DAVID G. OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW 10–23 (2005) (discussing the use of custom in 
providing defectiveness derives at least in part from its use in proving negligence). 
 197. Parchomovsky & Stein, supra note 185, at 299. 
 198. David Owen, Proof of Product Defect, 93 KY. L.J. 1, 5 (2004).  Plaintiffs may also seek to show that 
the product was defective by introducing evidence that other sellers use a safer design, but unless these other 
sellers are following best practices, this will not provide a basis for requiring that software developers follow 
best practices.  Id.  
 199. Such statutory reasonableness requirements are common.  As Smedinghoff notes in regard to 
statutory standards network security for businesses, “Laws and regulations rarely specify the security measures 
a business should implement to satisfy its legal obligations.  Most simply obligate companies to establish and 
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 200. COMPUTER SECURITY DIVISION, http://csrc.nist.gov/index.html.  Computer Security Division does 
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adopt and enforce its standards.  It could also delegate to an agency to fashion 
standards with advice from the private sector. There are well-known problems 
with the delegation approach.
202
  Regulatory capture in particular is a concern.  
The concern is that commercial interests that dominate the software industry 
will have such a powerful influence on the formulation of the standards that the 
standards will fall far short of genuine best practices, and instead advance 
commercial or special interests.
203
 
We now turn to issues that arise in using such a statute as a means to 
realizing the approximation goals. 
1. Avoiding a Lemons Market 
How would the statute ensure that there are a sufficient number of norm-
violation-detecting buyers?  As we noted in the discussion of negligence, the 
problem disappears if all developers follow best practices.  This is of course 
extremely unlikely, but it is also not required.  It is enough if almost all follow 
best practices.  The main problem then is to ensure sufficient compliance. 
But this may seem obviously wrong.  If some developers deviate from 
best practices, will not the conditions for a lemons market arise? Recall that a 
lemons market exists when the following conditions hold: (1) the products on 
the market vary significantly in the extent to which they have certain properties 
(vulnerabilities, in this case), and buyers regard products with the properties in 
question as having less expected value than those without them; (2) there is an 
asymmetry of information where buyers cannot discriminate between products 
with the properties and those without, but sellers can at least partially 
distinguish them; and furthermore, (3) there is no reliable signal of quality; 
 
not currently offer best standards for software development. 
 201. ANSI, http://www.ansi.org/ (last visited Feb. 3, 2012), does not currently offer standards for 
software development.  It refers to the International Standards Organization ISO/IEC 24773:2008 standard. 
New ISO/IEC International Standard to Certify Software Engineering Professionals, ANSI, 
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concerns standards in the sense of “a common platform that allows products to work together.”  Id. at 323.  
Essentially the same issues arise in defining best practices, however. 
 203. See Jon D. Hanson & David G.Yosifon, The Situation: An Introduction to the Situational Character, 
Critical Realism, Power Economics, and Deep Capture, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 129, 202–30 (2003) (explaining 
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CROSSROADS: AMERICAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY IN THE INTERNET AGE 392–95 (2005). 
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however, (4) buyers know there is a mix of products on the market.
204
 
We suggested earlier that (3) probably does not hold, but we will not rely 
on that suggestion here.  Instead, we note that (1) is most likely not fulfilled.  If 
almost all developers offer best-practices software, the probability of 
purchasing non-best practices software is very low; hence the existence of such 
software on the market only minutely affects the expected value of a purchase.  
Rational buyers will simply ignore the minimal impact.  They will not 
calculate the reduction in expected value of a purchase caused by the existence 
of vulnerability-ridden software.  The reason is that it is rational not to try to 
assess the small difference in expected value and simply treat all software as if 
it were best-practices software.  The costs of making the assessment are greater 
than any gain it yields.
205
  Thus, half of (1) will be true: buyers will regard 
vulnerability-ridden software as having less expected value than software with 
significantly fewer vulnerabilities.  But half of (1) will be false: the products 
on the market vary significantly in the extent to which they have 
vulnerabilities.  There will not be enough vulnerability-ridden software to 
make it rational to take the minimal reduction in expected value into account in 
purchasing decisions. 
2. Creating the Norm 
How will the statute help convince buyers that they ought conditionally to 
demand best practices software and ensure that they do demand it for that 
reason?  Our answer is that steps must be taken to “educate” buyers about the 
advantages of best-practices software.  We put “educate” in quotes because 
techniques for creating the conviction form a continuum from genuine 
education to manipulation.  At the “education” end, one presents the relevant 
information about the individual and social gains from more secure software 
and counts on rational reflection to create the conviction.  As one moves 
toward the “manipulation” end, one increasingly supplements presentation of 
information and rational reflection with techniques designed to produce the 
conviction in other ways.  The task is to use some combination of techniques to 
produce the desired conviction in buyers.  One possibility is that, in order to 
gain a competitive advantage, developers who comply with the statute might 
themselves inform consumers about the advantages of “best practices” 
software and tout their software not only as best-practices software, but as 
software that exceeds the legal minimum. Alternatively, there are 
governmental ways to change citizens’ minds, as the anti-littering, anti-
smoking, and anti-drug campaigns illustrate. 
 
 204. See supra Part VI.B. 
 205. See A. M. Odlyzko, The Case Against Micropayments, LECTURE NOTES IN COMPUTER SCI. 2742 at 
1, 5 (2003) (explaining that even small barriers to usage discourage usage). See also A. M. Odlyzko, Internet 
Pricing and the History of Communications, 36 COMPUTER NETWORKS 493, 501 (2001) (supporting the idea 
that fixed fees are more consumer-friendly). 
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3. Once the Norm is Established 
Once the norm is in place, it is important that buyers and software 
developers conform on their own initiative, not because of the threat of 
enforcement of statutory requirements; otherwise, one must rely on difficult, 
costly, and uncertain enforcement.  Developers will voluntarily conform as 
long as there is a sufficient number of norm-violation-detecting buyers.  Once 
the norm is in place, there may well be.  Developers themselves can ensure that 
buyers possess information about norm-inconsistent sellers.  If Microsoft, for 
example, offers norm-inconsistent software, Google’s advertising for its 
Chrome operating system can call that fact to buyers’ attentions.  Awareness of 
norm-inconsistent software can also come from publications like Consumer 




VIII.   CONCLUSION 
Software sales currently depart dramatically from the typical pattern of 
sales governed, more or less, by value optimal-norms in a relatively norm-
competitive market. Instead, buyers and developers are trapped in the 
“vulnerability-ridden” norm in a market that (most likely) falls far short of the 
norm-competitive ideal.  The solution is to devise a suitable statutory stepping 
stone toward a value-optimal best-practices norm governing software sales in a 
sufficiently norm-competitive market. 
 
 
 206. See Hillman, supra note 63, at 853 (discussing the pros and cons of watchdog groups). 
